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Abstract 
 
The agricultural virtual water trade is estimated to contribute 248 billion cubic metres to the water 
security of the MENA region every year, and this thesis examines the theory of the virtual water trade 
to find out how exactly the region has integrated into that trade. Despite sizeable and growing virtual 
water dependence in the region, and a state of abstract water scarcity, 85 percent of MENA water 
withdrawals are still committed to agriculture. For the region to commit its scarce water resources to 
low-value productivity such as agriculture carries a very high opportunity cost.  
 
This paper will ask the following questions: How has the MENA region integrated into the virtual water 
trade, what is the opportunity cost of its agricultural policies, and how does it perpetuate its 
agricultural policies? This paper makes two principal arguments. Firstly, this paper acknowledges the 
important role played by imported foodstuffs in meeting the food and water security needs of the 
region. Generally, the region imports low-value water-intensive crops such as wheat, and exports 
higher-value crops such as tomatoes and citrus fruits, though until recently wheat production has also 
been prominent and widespread in the region. This paper argues that because the MENA region relies 
on water from rivers and aquifers (blue water) to irrigate, whereas other parts of the world can make 
use more of soil moisture (green water), the opportunity costs for the water use in the MENA region 
are far greater than those in other parts of the world. This paper will make an attempt to calculate 
those costs, showing that the MENA region exports virtual water for a far higher opportunity cost than 
is borne by those countries that export virtual water to the MENA region. Secondly, this paper argues 
that the region’s reliance on imported virtual water backgrounds and conceals policies of water 
mismanagement and misallocation – policies which are then perpetuated by nationally and 
internationally funded major water engineering projects that prolong unsustainable practices. 
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Introduction 
 
The concept of virtual water was devised in 1993 by Professor Tony Allan of King’s College, London, to 
identify the means by which the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region – in spite of its pressing 
conditions of water scarcity – was avoiding a war for water.1 In spite of the doomsday predictions of 
pundits, scholars, soothsayers and the general public, there was no sign of imminent armed conflict 
over this most precious of resources – and in fact, studies demonstrated that “water wars” as they 
have come to be known have not been especially prevalent through the long tracts of history either. 
Despite dwindling water resources, despite droughts of increasing intensity and frequency, despite an 
explosion in localised demand for freshwater owing to higher consumption patterns per capita and a 
quadrupling of the MENA population since 1960, by the early 1990s there was no sign of a war over 
water. To explain this quandary, Professor Allan looked not to water itself, but to food, and to the 
international trade in food in particular.2 
 
Increasingly since the 1970s, the MENA region has been importing food on a massive scale. A region 
that contains the Fertile Crescent – once the breadbasket of the Mediterranean – has outgrown its 
domestic ability to feed itself.3 Agriculture represents the world’s most significant part of human water 
use, and in this the Middle East is no exception. To feed itself, the region requires a tremendous 
quantity of water – water that it does not have, but rather imports as “virtual” water embedded in 
the food products that supplement its diet. 
 
This essay will investigate – using datasets from the World Bank and the United Nations – how the 
MENA region has integrated into the global trade in virtual water. I will show that this integration is 
not a one-way street, but that the region of our focus exports significant quantities of virtual water as 
well. Although the MENA region is a net importer of virtual water, most of that which it imports could 
not be used for purposes other than growing food, whereas much of that which it exports carries an 
extremely high opportunity cost when committed to agricultural use. Generally, the region imports 
low-value water-intensive crops such as wheat, and exports higher-value crops such as tomatoes and 
citrus fruits. However, even for these higher value crops the opportunity cost of committing scarce 
water to agriculture continues to be significant. In short, this essay argues that while virtual water 
certainly flows into the region, the benefits of water use are far more likely to flow out of the region. 
 
There is a further argument that this thesis will make, and it is one which is intricately connected to 
the flows in and out of both virtual water and water benefits vis a vis the Middle East. This argument 
is that the region’s reliance on virtual water for basic food needs is concealing – “backgrounding” – 
the unsustainable water management policies that promote the high opportunity cost that exists in 
                                                          
1 The United Nation’s Food and Agricultural Office (FAO) and AQUASTAT identify the following region as 
comprising the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a region falling under the competence of the FAO Sub-
Regional Office of the Near East and North Africa: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the 
United Arab Emirates, Yemen. The World Bank definition of the MENA region additionally includes Israel, the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (the West Bank and Gaza), and Djibouti. Noticeably, Turkey – one of the most 
water-blessed countries in the general region – is not included in either of these definitions. This essay 
generally uses the World Bank definition, unless otherwise specified, and includes Turkey in the appendix as an 
additional statistic. 
2 Allan, “Fortunately there are substitutes for water otherwise our hydro-political futures would be 
impossible”, in Priorities for water resources allocation and management, (London: ODA, 1993), pp. 13-26. 
3 See later arguments around Figure 6. 
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MENA’s water use and allocation. This backgrounding is perpetuated furthermore by those very same 
water management policies which see major water engineering projects boost water supply 
unsustainably in order to continue misallocation. In other words, virtual water imports keep food on 
the shelves which ensures water management reform remains a low political priority. At the same 
time, the existing and inefficient water management policies that allocate the majority of water to 
agriculture keep farms operating, thus giving the illusion of domestic food security and keeping 
powerful interest groups (often with interests in agricultural land) appeased. The policies of inefficient 
water allocation for this purpose are maintained by major engineering projects to increase the supply 
of water – for example, by installing pumps and pipelines to extract water from aquifers deep beneath 
the ground. This argument of backgrounding in order to sustain misallocation is a development of a 
recent concept proposed by Professor Allan in which virtual water reliance itself is backgrounded in 
order to maintain the aforementioned illusion of domestic food security. 
 
The arguments of this thesis support the notion that water scarcity does not cause war in high politics. 
One can scarcely fail to notice, however, that the region is, at the time of writing, in the grip of some 
of the most brutal conflicts in a generation. It has been argued – very convincingly – that water scarcity 
has played a substantial part in the causality that has led to these conflicts – in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and 
in Libya.4 Nonetheless, there is no contradiction between the arguments of this essay and the 
arguments that link current conflicts in the region to water scarcity. This is because those current 
conflicts are not about water but have had the flames of their causality fanned by water scarcity by 
means that are distinctly within the arena of low politics – droughts, migrations, and social unrest. We 
are thus seeing in current affairs the dire consequences of long-term water misallocation and 
unsustainable water policies, even while the prospect of high politics warfare over water resources 
remains a non-event. 
 
This paper carefully nestles into an established and ongoing academic discourse. The discourse 
surrounding water security and the global agricultural trade is by definition global not provincial, and 
so the academic literature has largely considered the MENA region as a case study to illuminate 
broader concerns. And yet, the region is a special case study as well, being supremely dry, supremely 
populated, and yet excessively watered. As such, the methodological approach of this paper is to treat 
the MENA region as a special case – an extreme case – of issues that are more or less global in scope. 
I take the literature that has dealt with the MENA region as a subset of a global phenomenon and 
attempt to build upon that work, to expand the scholarly understanding of the region as a special case 
study and to identify how further research could be conducted as well. This paper is intended to hone 
thoughts and theories that exist in the academic literature. This paper chooses not to take the 
approach of a single case study at national level, but a single case study at regional level (i.e. the MENA 
                                                          
4 See, for example, DuBois-King, Marcus, “The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq”, in The Washington 
Quarterly, Winter 2016, pp. 153-169, 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b94f/9f9e4d8c99429c7a134ca618c38631d6c6f1.pdf, accessed 21/2/2017. 
He discusses this issue in terms of the systematic effects of climate change, which have been exacerbated by 
policy failures in water management and allocation, and he traces a chain of cause and effect ranging from 
first-order effects such as changes in the physical environment (for example, higher temperatures), through 
second-order effects such as droughts and desertification, through third-order effects such as severe stress on 
agriculture and food security, and finally to fourth-order effects such as mass migrations and conflicts. He 
writes, “forced migration and short-term and historical policy failures were fourth-order effects [in Syria] that 
deepened pre-existing ethnic and socio-political fractures. Migration was especially disruptive in Syria, where 
farmers and herders were forced to move to cities in search of more productive work, only to be relegated to 
peripheral shanty towns. There are clear signs that these factors contributed to the rise of militant 
extremism”, p. 155. 
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region), which in effect (considering that the amalgamation of data is primarily gathered as per 
national borders) means a study of “correlations of data across cases”.5  By studying national data and 
observing regional trends, the paper arrives at its conclusions which are found to be broadly and 
usefully applicable across the entire MENA region. 
 
As part of its methods, will investigate datasets from the World Trade Organisation; the World Bank; 
and the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organisation’s FAOSTAT and AQUASTAT datasets. This essay 
presents a brief background to water scarcity, water allocation, and virtual water reliance in the 
Middle East, after which a literature review identifies some of the key theories and terms that will be 
employed in the following empirical chapters. The first of these two empirical chapters will investigate 
datasets to establish how the MENA region trades food, and will estimate the opportunity costs that 
are carried by those flows. The second of the empirical chapters will investigate how water 
misallocation is backgrounded both by virtual water reliance and by short-term water engineering 
projects. This thesis will conclude with an overview of these topics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 George, Alexander, and Bennett, Andrew, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. 13, discussing case study selection theory and methodologies in respect 
of the works of King, Keohane, and Verba, Sidney, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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Background 
 
In 1916, James Henry Breasted first described those lands of the ancient places of Mesopotamia, Elam, 
Assyria, Phoenicia, Palestine, and Upper and Lower Egypt, encompassing the rivers of the Nile, the 
Euphrates, and the Tigris – a great geographic semi-circle – as “the Fertile Crescent”.6 Otherwise 
known as “the cradle of civilisation”, it was in these lands that new technologies of irrigation 
supported some of the world’s first and greatest civilisations. Today, that part of the world consists of 
the modern political units of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, and parts of Turkey and Iran. 
It is easy to think of these countries as barren desert, mystical and sparse in the great Orientalist 
traditions. It is easy to assume that the fertile part of this crescent is confined to history, and that a 
once lush landscape has been ground to sand. In truth, the region was not once fertile and is now 
barren – on the contrary, it has always required extensive irrigation. And the premise of contemporary 
unfruitfulness is also out of place. Until the mid-2000s, Syria produced an excess of food – more than 
enough to feed its national population.7 In the Jordan Valley, the land is lush with agriculture. In Saudi 
Arabia, even, though far outside of the Fertile Crescent, so much wheat was being produced in the 
early 1990s that the country became the world’s sixth largest exporter of that commodity. Across the 
region, rivers, wadis, aquifers, and the bounty of the skies during the rainy season are used to grow 
enormous quantities of food. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Fertile Crescent 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
 
In the MENA region, 85 percent of freshwater withdrawn is used for agricultural purposes – be that 
the irrigation of crops or the pastoral rearing of livestock (see Appendix A: Figure A1). This is an 
                                                          
6 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, “The Fertile Crescent”, 9/4/2015, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Fertile-Crescent, accessed 1/2/2017. 
7 Wind, Ella, and Dahi, Omar, “Syria’s agricultural development: current realities and historical roots”, paper 
delivered at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, 2014, 
https://lettres.unifr.ch/fileadmin/Documentation/Departements/Sciences_historiques/Histoire_des_societes_
modernes_et_contemporaines/Images/Recherche/WIND_and_DAHI_Agriculture_Syria_Fribourg_.pdf, 
accessed 1/2/2017. 
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enormous allocation for a region which is semi-arid climactically and which on the whole is one of the 
driest parts of the world. The United Nation’s Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimates that 
average annual rainfall in North Africa is about 96mm, while in the Middle East it is slightly higher at 
217mm. Egypt has the lowest level of annual precipitation in the entire world (51mm per year), 
followed by Libya (56mm per year), and third is Saudi Arabia (59mm per year).8 Figure 2 shows just 
how extreme and widespread in the region these dry conditions are. 
 
 
Figure 2: MENA: Mean Annual Precipitation (mm) 
 
I have modified this figure by adding information about the types of farming such conditions can support, 
source: CIA, “Issues in the Middle East”, in Atlas, 1973, accessed via the Perry-Castaneda Library Map 
Collection, University of Texas Libraries, “Middle East – Mean Annual Rainfall”, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east.html, accessed 29/11/2016. 
 
Source of map: FAO (2011), Average Annual Rainfall, Maps and Spatial Data, 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/maps/index.stm, accessed 20/12/2016. 
 
 
Rainfall either feeds into tributaries and rivers (becoming “surface water”), seeps deep beneath the 
surface to slowly replenish underground aquifers (becoming “groundwater”), evaporates, or remains 
embedded as moisture in the soil. This soil moisture is known to geographers as “green water”. Green 
                                                          
8 FAO, “Precipitation and Renewable Freshwater Resources”, December 2014, 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/didyouknow/print1.stm, accessed 29/11/2016. 
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water can only be used for agriculture or to support local ecosystems and is part of the landscape of 
human water exploitation that is frequently overlooked. The rainfall that drains into tributaries or 
aquifers is known to geographers as “blue water”. When water security is discussed, it is usually blue 
water that is meant. Blue water can be pumped from aquifers, or diverted, stored, and drawn from 
rivers. 
 
Given that the MENA region receives so little rainfall, the waters that have gathered gradually over 
millennia in deep underground aquifers have taken on a principal role in supplementing water security 
for domestic, industrial, and agricultural purposes. This groundwater is a significant resource, 
amounting to 30.1 percent of the world’s freshwater, while just 1.3 percent is surface water.9 In Saudi 
Arabia, the fact that in the early 1990s the country was a major exporter of wheat was entirely due to 
exploitation of that country’s vast groundwater resources – so much so that had extraction continued 
at the same rate as occurred in that decade the Saudi aquifers would have been entirely spent in 20 
years. There exist in the MENA region vast networks of underground aquifers, and generally (owing 
to low rainfall and local geological conditions) these have extremely slow rates of recharge.10 This 
means that – on a human timescale at least – once an underground aquifer is depleted, it is gone 
                                                          
9 FAO, “Precipitation and Renewable Freshwater Resources”, December 2014, 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/didyouknow/print1.stm, accessed 29/11/2016. The remaining 68.6% is 
locked in glaciers and ice caps. 
10 Figure FN1 
 
Source: UNESCO, “Large Aquifer Systems of the World: Global Groundwater Maps”, (UNESCO: Delft, 2008), 
http://www.whymap.org/whymap/EN/Downloads/Global_maps/globalmaps_node_en.html, accessed 
29/11/2016. 
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forever. Wells have rapidly depleted aquifer water tables across the region, a process which was 
accelerated with the rapid and unregulated installation of pumps beginning in the 1960s and 1970s.11 
In 2015, the World Resources Institute assessed that by 2040 every country in the MENA region, bar 
Egypt, will have an “extremely high” (i.e. over 80 percent) ratio of water withdrawals to replenishment 
from these groundwater aquifers.12 
 
Water security essentially means having enough freshwater to support the needs of society and the 
economy sustainably.13 It is this emphasis on sustainability that limits the relevance of slowly-
recharging groundwater resources to water security, and the quantity of surface water is thus crucial. 
Generally, it has been surface blue water – not green – that has been primarily considered when 
discussing water security, largely for reasons of convenience of measurement and the obviousness of 
those resources. 
 
The lower a country’s water security levels, the higher that country’s water stress, and Maplecroft’s 
Water Stress Index ranks all top ten of the most “extreme risk” cases of water stress as countries in 
the MENA region.14 Water scarcity can be measured using four principal methodologies which have 
been usefully described by Chris White at the Global Water Forum.15 The most commonly used is the 
Falkenmark Indicator, or Water Stress Index, which is typically used by international bodies, 
academics, and at policy forums. This is a per capita measurement of freshwater availability (within a 
defined geographical area) by volume, and the key thresholds defining water stress are outlined in the 
table below. 
                                                          
11 Foppen, “Impact of high-strength wastewater infiltration on groundwater quality and drinking water supply: 
the case of Sana'a, Yemen”, in The Journal of Hydrology, pp. 198-216, Vol. 263, Summer 2002. 
12 World Resources Institute, “Aqueduct Projected Water Stress Country Rankings”, August 2015, 
http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/aqueduct-water-stress-country-rankings-technical-note.pdf, accessed 
29/11/2016. See also Water Resources Institute, “Ranking the World’s most Water Stressed Countries in 
2040”, 26/10/2015, http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/08/ranking-world%E2%80%99s-most-water-stressed-
countries-2040, accessed 29/11/2016. 
13 The United Nation’s working definition of water security is: “The capacity of a population to safeguard 
sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-
being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-
related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability”. See UN Water 
2013, “Water Security”, http://www.unwater.org/topics/water-security/en/, accessed 1/2/2017. 
14 Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the disputed territory of Western Sahara, Yemen, Israel, 
Djibouti, and Jordan. See Maplecroft, Water Stress Index (2011), 
https://maplecroft.com/about/news/water_stress_index.html, accessed on 29/11/2016. 
15 These four methods are: The Falkenmark Indicator / Water Stress Index (explained in-text); the criticality 
ratio (measures scarcity as being based on the proportion of total annual water withdrawals to the total 
amount of water available – a country is water scarce if its withdrawals are 20-40% of annual supply, and 
severely water scarce if they exceed 40%); the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) method 
(measures water consumption not water withdrawals, and assesses a country’s capacity for water 
management infrastructure development and efficiency improvement – countries which can meet their water 
consumption needs BUT ONLY with water infrastructure and efficiency improvements are classified as 
“economically water scarce”, while countries which cannot meet their water consumption needs EVEN WITH 
water infrastructure and efficiency improvements are classified as “physically water scarce”); the Water 
Poverty Index (a highly complex approach measuring:  the level of access to water; water quantity, quality, and 
variability; water used for domestic, food, and productive purposes; capacity for water management; and 
environmental aspects). For more details, references, and an assessment of the pros and cons of each of these 
methods, see White, Chris, “Understanding Water Scarcity: Definitions and Measurements”, The Global Water 
Forum, 07/05/2012, http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2012/05/07/understanding-water-scarcity-definitions-
and-measurements/, accessed on 29/11/2016. 
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Figure 3: The Falkenmark Indicator / Water Stress Index 
 
 
 
Source: White, Chris, “Understanding Water Scarcity: Definitions and Measurements”, The Global Water 
Forum, 07/05/2012, http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2012/05/07/understanding-water-scarcity-definitions-
and-measurements/, accessed on 29/11/2016. Note that these thresholds refer to renewable freshwater. 
 
 
The typical geographical area used in analysis is the nation state unit – as White notes in his article, 
the data needed for this level of analysis is “readily available”.16 However, as he and many others have 
also noted, the national level cannot adequately come to terms with international (cross-boundary) 
geography, climate, watersheds, river flows, and aquifers. AQUASTAT, a division of the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations, acknowledges this problem, and so attempts 
to disaggregate the flows of water that are internationally shared from the flows of water that are 
unique to a particular country. They thus use the concepts of Internal Renewable Water Resources 
(IRWR), External Renewable Water Resources (ERWR), and Total Renewable Water Resources (TRWR). 
See Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Calculating Water Resources 
 
 
 
Sources: FAO/AQUASTAT, “Chapter 3: Method Used to Compute Water Resources by Country”, in Water 
Reports 23: A Review of World Water Resources by Country 2016, 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/Y4473E/y4473e07.htm, accessed 29/11/2016;  
World Bank, World Development Indicators: Freshwater, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5, accessed on 
29/11/2016. 
 
 
To look at the water inside a country, but also to include river flow that originates outside a country, 
we must use the Total Renewable Water Resources (TRWR) category. This is a reasonable measure to 
gauge the renewable freshwater that is available in a particular country. However, as AQUASTAT note 
in their methodology, “to avoid double counting, the IRWR is the only variable that can be aggregated 
for regional or continental assessments”.17 So, it is necessary to use TRWR to assess the resources of 
a particular country, but IRWR to assess averages for an entire region. 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 FAO/AQUASTAT, “Chapter 3: Method Used to Compute Water Resources by Country”, Water Reports 23: A 
Review of World Water Resources by Country 2016, http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/Y4473E/y4473e07.htm, 
accessed 29/11/2016. 
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For water stress to be measured as a per capita function, as it is calculated in the Falkenmark Indicator, 
of course means that the measurement is sensitive to changes in population. The population in the 
MENA region has increased fourfold since the early 1960s, from 105 million in 1960 to 315 million in 
2000 and to between 424 million and 468 million in 2015.18 Most modern demographers consider that 
while population growth is not necessarily a negative determinant of social and economic resilience, 
rapid population growth nonetheless “retards the development process and stresses the polity”.19 
With growing populations comes growing demand for food, energy, and water. 
 
 
Figure 5: Population growth in the MENA region 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data from the World Bank, MENA: Population (2016), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=DZ (download dataset), accessed 29/11/2016 
(low estimate); and FAO/AQUASTAT, General Database Catalogue (2016), 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/results.html, and 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4473E/y4473E00.pdf, accessed 29/11/2016 (high estimate). 
 
 
                                                          
18 World Bank, MENA: Population (2016), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=DZ 
(download dataset), accessed 29/11/2016; FAO/AQUASTAT, General Database Catalogue (2016), 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/results.html, and 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4473E/y4473E00.pdf, accessed 29/11/2016; Population Reference Bureau 
(PRB), Population Trends and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa (2001), 
http://www.prb.org/pdf/PoptrendsMiddleEast.pdf, accessed 29/11/2016. 
19 Richards, Alan, and Waterbury, John, A Political Economy of the Middle East, (Westview Press: Colorado, 
2008), p. 72. This view of most modern demographers is a rejection of both sides in the “Malthus versus Marx” 
debate. Malthusians suggest that excessive demographic growth leads to a societal collapse back to 
subsistence conditions, as the population exceeds the agricultural capacity to sustain it. That is, The City dies. 
Marxists claim the opposite – that it is societal retardation and localised “collapse” that leads to population 
growth. There is also an additional perspective: Neo-Panglossians suggest that population growth principally 
leads to economic growth, progress, and an ever more vibrant City. See Richards and Waterbury (pp. 71-2) for 
an overview. 
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Figure A2 (see Appendix A) lists the data relevant to population, TRWR, and IRWR, by country and 
region, including per capita. The MENA region has an average of 233 cubic metres of renewable 
freshwater available per person per year, or 460 cubic metres if Turkey is included in the calculation 
(see Appendix A: Figure A2). This places the region well within the Falkenmark definition of absolute 
water scarcity. 
 
If we assume that the quantity of renewable freshwater in the MENA region has remained constant 
over the past century, which is approximately true, it is possible for us to assess at what point the 
population of the region exceeded its ability to satisfy its water security needs, even theoretically. 
Taking the Falkenmark threshold for water stress as our limit, that is 1,700 cubic metres per person 
per year, it is possible to plot the amount of water required by the population of the region against 
the static volume of renewable freshwater available, as has been done in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: MENA Water Availability and Requirements over Time 
 
Sources: Based on data from multiple sources: The Falkenmark Indicator (threshold for water stress is 1,700 
cubic metres per person per year); MENA Population Data: World Bank, MENA: Population (2016), 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=DZ (download dataset), accessed 29/11/2016 
(low estimate); Water availability: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Freshwater, 
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5, accessed on 29/11/2016. 
 
 
By referring to Figure 6 and its dataset (see Appendix A: Figure A3), the year in which the MENA region 
could no longer even theoretically support its burgeoning population’s water security needs came in 
1970. The fundamentals of population growth and low rainfall mean that the MENA region’s 
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renewable blue water is simply insufficient to lift the region out of water stress. Figure 7 illustrates 
further information – the United Nations has estimated that self-sufficient food security alone 
requires 1,000 cubic metres per person annually. Clearly, the MENA region cannot support itself in 
terms of its internal renewable freshwater resources. The “water footprint” of the MENA region, as 
given in Figure 7, is the entire water reliance of the MENA region – including renewable water use, 
non-renewable groundwater use, and imported virtual water. 
 
 
Figure 7: MENA Water Needs and Reliance 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data from multiple sources: The Falkenmark Indicator (threshold for water stress is 1,700 
cubic metres per person per year); Water availability: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Freshwater, 
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5, accessed on 29/11/2016; Water needs: UN Water 2013, “Water Security”, 
http://www.unwater.org/topics/water-security/en/, accessed 1/2/2017; Water footprint: Water Footprint 
Network, “The Water Footprint Assessment Manual” (London: Earthscan, 2011), 
http://waterfootprint.org/media/downloads/TheWaterFootprintAssessmentManual_2.pdf, accessed 
1/2/2017; Mekonnen & Hoekstra, National Water Footprint Accounts, Value of Water Research Report Series 
No. 50 (Delft: UNESCO-IHE, 2011), http://waterfootprint.org/media/downloads/Report50-
NationalWaterFootprints-Vol1.pdf, accessed 1/2/2017. 
 
 
Figure 7 provides a reference that will be drawn on subsequently in this thesis, as a useful visual 
comparison between the different datasets represented. 
 
For later reference in this paper, let us summarise the main points made in this background section. 
The MENA region grows significant quantities of food, and this production is reliant upon extensive 
irrigation. Eighty-five percent of MENA water withdrawals are allocated to the agricultural sector. This 
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is in a region with a semi-arid climate of low rainfall, meaning that irrigation relies significantly on 
extracted groundwater. For the same reason, the region’s access to sustainably renewable freshwater 
resources is limited, undermining the region’s water security. The water stress experienced by the 
region is a function not only of the quantity of renewable freshwater available but also of the 
population, which has quadrupled since 1960. The MENA region is in a state of extreme water stress 
as a result of these factors. 
 
For easy reference, definitions for terms such as blue water, green water, TRWR, and so on, are given 
in a glossary in Appendix C. 
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Literature Review 
 
Existing scholarship on water scarcity and the virtual water trade discusses the water challenges of 
the region without assessing the opportunity cost of the region’s continued commitment to the 
agricultural allocation of freshwater. This thesis argues that although the MENA region has 
increasingly relied on imported food (and virtual water) since the 1990s, the opportunity cost of 
MENA’s continuing agricultural sector is still higher than its savings. This thesis will attempt to quantify 
the opportunity costs of water allocation to the region’s agricultural sector. This thesis will also argue 
that reliance on virtual water imports has a backgrounding effect for the water mismanagement and 
misallocation policies of MENA governments, and that major and costly water engineering projects 
extend the life of unsustainable farming practices rather than challenging and reforming them. Firstly, 
in this literature review, we will examine the set of literature that discusses how the MENA region has 
integrated into the global virtual water trade and the application of costings to water use. Secondly, 
we will discuss the literature that examines decoupling in the context of water security, as well as two 
conferences I was able to attend in the course of preparing this thesis. A general appraisal of these 
conferences is included as Appendix B. 
 
Allan’s concept of virtual water was devised to explain why water scarce countries were not going to 
war over water. Realist theory – based on power-play at the national level – would seem to suggest 
that nation states in competition over an increasingly scarce resource will fight, and the concepts of 
conflict and water have been enthusiastically linked in both the academic literature and public 
discourse to produce the doomsday scenario of major “water wars”.20 However, Allan noted that such 
armed conflicts were not, in fact, occurring. His theory of virtual water was thus devised, suggesting 
that the global trade of agricultural and industrial products offers mitigation and potential stabilisation 
to an excessive water footprint when measured against local water supply.21 22 Every tonne of 
imported wheat, for example, enables the purchasing country to “escape the economic and political 
                                                          
20 Several elaborate “hydraulic imperative” theories have been developed that “point to water not only as 
cause of historic armed conflict but also as the resource that will bring combatants to the battlefield in the 
twenty-first century” (Priscoli, Jerome, and Wolf, Aaron, Managing and Transforming Water Conflicts, 
International Hydrology Series, (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), p. 10). Even the World Bank Vice-President wrote in 
the New York Times that “the wars of the next century will be about water” (Serageldin, in New York Times, 
“Severe Water Crisis Ahead for Poorest Nations in Next 2 Decades”, by Barbara Crossette, 10th August 1995, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/10/world/severe-water-crisis-ahead-for-poorest-nations-in-next-2-
decades.html, accessed 1/2/2017). See: Westing, Global Resources and International Conflict: Environmental 
Factors in Strategic Policy and Action, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Gleick, “Water and conflict: 
Fresh water resources and international security”, in International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1993, pp.79-112; 
Remans, “Water and War”, in Humantares Volkerrecht, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1995, pp. 1-14; Samson and Charrier, 
International freshwater conflict: Issues and prevention strategies, (Geneva: Green Cross International, 1997); 
Butts, “The strategic importance of water”, in Parameters, Vol. 27, 1997, pp. 65-83. See also: Homer-Dixon, 
“On the Threshold: Environmental changes as causes of acute conflict”, in International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2, 
(1991), pp. 76-116; Amery, “Water wars in the Middle East: A looming threat”, Vol. 4 No. 168, (2002), pp. 313-
323; and others. For popular literature see: Bulloch and Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle 
East, (London: St. Edmundsbury Press, 1993). 
21 Allan, “Virtual water: An essential element in stabilising the political economies of the Middle East”, in 
Transformations of Middle Eastern natural environments: Lessons and Legacies, ed. J. Albert, et al, Bulletin 
Series No. 103, November, (New Haven: Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, 1998), pp. 141-
149; Allan, “Virtual water: The water, food, and trade nexus – useful concept or misleading metaphor?”, SOAS 
/ King’s College Water Research Group, IWRA, in Water International, Vol. 28, No. 1, March 2003. 
22 The total water reliance of an economy and society (often measured per capita) is conceptualised as a 
“water footprint”, including not only direct water use but also virtual water reliance. 
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stress of mobilising 1,000 cubic metres of water”,23 and globally, indeed, 13% of water used for crop 
production is for export.24 Thus, local water scarcity is circumnavigated to produce water security.25 
 
The trade in virtual water incorporates all water used in the production process of any given good. 
Partially, such a trade is possible and affordable because the environmental costs of production – 
including water use – are not factored in to the pricing of commodities, as acknowledged by Allan26 
and discussed further by Anderson and Gaines in an appendix to a seminal work on international 
hydrology written or otherwise compiled by Priscoli and Wolf.27 This means water costs are 
undervalued, whether that water is being used in water-rich parts of the world, or water-scarce parts 
such as the MENA region. Water scarcity means that desert or semi-arid countries must rely upon 
their blue water resources to irrigate if they make the political choice to pursue food production. This 
is a choice that the MENA region has made but it should be emphasised that this decision has been 
made in conditions of ineffective water pricing mechanisms. 
 
The most notable case of an arid country making the political choice to support food production in 
spite of water scarcity and because of ambivalence or recklessness towards water under-pricing is 
Saudi Arabia, at least until very recently. Elie Elhadj – a former banker turned academic commentator 
– has astutely investigated this case study and has applied costing to this usage of water in such an 
arid environment. He traces how Saudi Arabia produced and exported great quantities of wheat, 
barley, lucerne (also known as alfalfa), red meat, poultry, and milk, until 2003 when “the government 
imposed a five-year ban on the allocation of public land for farming”.28 Between 1997 and 2001, Elhadj 
calculates the following data, which has been represented in this present paper in tabular form for 
ease of comprehension. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Allan, “Virtual water: The water, food, and trade nexus – useful concept or misleading metaphor”, p. 9. 
24 Hoekstra and Hung, “Virtual Water: A quantification of virtual water flows between nations in relation to 
international crop trade”, Value of Water: Research Report No. 11, (Delft: UNESCO-IHE, 2002), 
http://waterfootprint.org/media/downloads/Report11.pdf, accessed 22/12/2016. 
25 See Allan, “Substitutes for water are being found in the Middle East and North Africa”, in Geo-Journal, Vol. 
28, No. 3, November 1992, pp. 375-385; Allan, “Fortunately there are substitutes for water otherwise our 
hydro-political futures would be impossible”, in Priorities for water resources allocation and management, 
(London: ODA, 1993), pp. 13-26; Allan, “Virtual Water: A strategic resource: Global solutions to regional 
deficits”, in Groundwater, Vol. 36, No. 4, July/August 1998b, pp. 545-6; Allan, The Middle East Water Question: 
Hydro-politics and the Global Economy, (London: IB Tauris, 2012). 
26 Allan, Virtual Water, (London: IB Tauris, 2011), p. 8. 
27 Anderson, Kristin, and Gaines, Lisa, “International water pricing: An overview and historic and modern case 
studies”, pp. 249-265, in Priscoli, Jerome, and Wolf, Aaron, Managing and Transforming Water Conflicts, 
International Hydrology Series, (Cambridge: CUP, 2009). 
28 Elie Elhadj, “Camels don’t fly, deserts don’t bloom: An assessment of Saudi Arabia’s experiment in desert 
agriculture”, SOAS/KCL Water Research Group, Occasional Paper No. 48, pp.6-7, 
https://www.soas.ac.uk/water/publications/papers/file38391.pdf, accessed 1/2/2017, p. 6. 
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Figure 8: Saudi Arabia Virtual Water Exports and Value (1997-2001) 
 
 
 
Source: Elie Elhadj, “Camels don’t fly, deserts don’t bloom: An assessment of Saudi Arabia’s experiment in 
desert agriculture”, SOAS/KCL Water Research Group, Occasional Paper No. 48, pp.6-7, 
https://www.soas.ac.uk/water/publications/papers/file38391.pdf, accessed 1/2/2017. 
 
 
This data shows that the Saudi experiment in food production and export has used an enormous 
quantity of blue water. Readers will recall that Saudi Arabia is the third most rain scarce country on 
the planet (see p. 5), and Elhadj’s study confirms that about 90 percent of Saudi Arabia’s farming water 
use is from non-renewable blue water (i.e. groundwater aquifers).29 This data also offers a valuation 
for the goods produced with that water: every year between 1997 and 2001, 303 million USD were 
earned for a water use of 2.488 billion cubic metres. That is equivalent to 0.12 USD per cubic metre of 
water. 
 
Elhadj widens his study to arrive at the following data for 1984-2000, presented in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Saudi Arabia Costs and International Value of Farming Products (1984-2000) 
 
 
 
Source: Elie Elhadj, p. 18. 
 
 
Clearly the 0.12 USD per cubic metre of water (in the period 1997-2001) is not actually the whole story 
because Figure 9 demonstrates blatantly that investment in agriculture (including direct investment 
as well as subsidies) was higher in Saudi Arabia than the value of the goods it produced. If we average 
the 83.6 billion USD that was invested in the period 1984-2000, then we see that per annum 5.225 
billion USD was invested. This must be subtracted from the 303 million USD earned per annum as 
shown in Figure 8. Thus, we can calculate that the water used for farming was actually valued at a 
loss of 1.98 USD per cubic metre between 1997 and 2001. To put this in another way, between 1997 
and 2001 Saudi Arabia was paying a net value of 1.98 USD for every cubic metre of water it allocated 
to farming. This is an astonishing finding, and one which highlights the under-pricing of environmental 
inputs (including water) into economic activity. The information calculated here goes further than 
Elhadj’s work, but is of course founded upon his work. 
                                                          
29 Ibid, p. 23. 
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Elhadj shies away from approximating the opportunity cost for the future of Saudi water allocation 
choices, but undoubtedly there is a significant opportunity cost. Despite Elhadj’s reticence, we can 
make some estimates of this. In a more contemporary, but different, case study, it has been calculated 
by Michael Gilmont and Lara Nasser that in Jordan in 2014 agricultural water use carried a value per 
unit of water of 0.72 Jordanian Dinar (JD) (1.02 USD), while industrial water use carried 47.7 JD (67.25 
USD) per unit of water,30 which is 66.25 times higher (see Appendix B). Thus, to allocate 1 cubic metre 
of water in Jordan to the agricultural sector rather than the industrial sector carried an opportunity 
cost of 66.23 USD in 2014. This essay will investigate datasets from the World Bank that will enable us 
to ascertain an estimate of the opportunity costs for Saudi Arabia in the Elhadj case. Suffice to say for 
now that the use of blue water for farming purposes is in economic terms a tremendously wasteful 
use of resources. With respect to this Saudi Arabian experiment in farming production, Allan 
commented in 1992 that, 
 
“The Saudi experience would appear to mark the extreme of what an economy is 
prepared to devote to the achievement of the indigenous production of food staples 
such as wheat… in circumstances of unlimited supplies of capital. The answer seems 
to be about four to six times the world price of wheat”.31 
 
 
We have seen something of how the topics of the virtual water trade and water pricing (and 
opportunity cost) have been dealt with by scholars in the literature. It was shown in the background 
to this paper, however, that it is not only blue water but also green water that is relevant to the 
allocation of water to farming use. Green water is of minimal significance in the Saudi case, but for 
other countries in the region green water is very significant indeed – and indeed its significance only 
rises further when we consider the type of virtual water that is imported by the MENA region. Green 
water has only recently begun to be considered in the literature in any detail, but separate works by 
Tamea et al, Carr et al, and Marta Antonelli have made strident attempts at incorporating this valuable 
concept into the debate on how the MENA region has integrated into the virtual water trade.32 
 
Tamea et al and Carr et al have contributed significant research to the understanding of how much 
virtual water is traded globally and also in specific relation to the MENA region – and how much of 
this traded virtual water is green and how much blue. Antonelli draws on this data heavily. Between 
1986 and 2010, the global trade in virtual water – that is, all the embedded water that has changed 
hands between countries around the world – amounted to an annual average of 1.512 trillion cubic 
metres. The MENA region made up 198 billion cubic metres of this. These figures consist of both green 
and blue water, and the breakdown of this trade is presented here in tabular format (see Figure 10). 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 See Appendix B. 
31 Allan, “Substitutes for water are being found in the Middle East and North Africa”, in Geo-Journal, Vol. 28, 
No. 3, November 1992, pp. 380-1. 
32 Tamea S., Allameno P., Carr J.A., Claps P., Laio F., and Ridolfi L., “Local and global perspectives on the virtual 
water trade” in Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, Vol. 17, 2013, pp. 1205-1215; Carr J.A., D’Odorico P., 
Laio F., and Ridolfi L., “Recent history and geography of virtual water trade”, in PLoS ONE, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2013, 
e55825; and Antonelli, Marta, “Water Resources, Food Security, and Virtual Water Trade in the Middle East 
and North Africa Region”, unpublished doctoral thesis, 2014. 
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Figure 10: Total Virtual Water Trade, Annual Averages (1986-2010) 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data presented in Antonelli, Marta, “Water Resources, Food Security, and Virtual Water 
Trade in the Middle East and North Africa Region”, unpublished doctoral thesis, 2014, p. 270 
 
 
We see from Figure 10 that the MENA region accounts for 26 percent of the global flows of blue water, 
even though the region’s endowment is only 0.5 percent of the world’s renewable blue water.33 It is 
important to note, however, that the data presented in Figure 10 includes both imports and exports, 
and trade both within the MENA region and between that region and another. If we isolate the amount 
of virtual water traded between the MENA region and the rest of the world, as Antonelli has done 
(again drawing heavily on Tamea et al and Carr et al), we see that “on average, the MENA region 
exports 5 [billion cubic metres] of blue water per year outside the region”.34 This is shown clearly in 
Figure 11, and Figure 12 highlights the percentage of virtual water imports and exports into and out 
of the region that is green and blue respectively, for the year 2010. 
 
 
Figure 11: MENA Virtual Water Imports and Exports for Selected Years (1986, 1998, 2010) 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data presented in Antonelli, Marta, “Water Resources, Food Security, and Virtual Water 
Trade in the Middle East and North Africa Region”, unpublished doctoral thesis, 2014, p.271. 
 
Figure 12: MENA Virtual Water Imports and Exports, Percentage of which Green and Blue (2010) 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Figure 11. 
 
 
This data will be drawn on throughout this paper, as it is extremely useful – pivotal, in fact – to 
understanding how the MENA region has integrated into the global virtual water trade. 
                                                          
33 The MENA region has an endowment of 231.3 billion cubic metres of renewable blue water per annum, 
compared to the world’s total of 42.810 trillion cubic metres. See World Bank, World Development Indicators: 
Freshwater, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5, accessed on 12/1/2017. 
34 Antonelli, 2014, p. 270. 
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It is clear that green water is a very important aspect of the MENA region’s mobilisation of its water 
resources. This is true despite having an arid or semi-arid climate with limited rainfall, and the 
academic literature has investigated this fact to assess the availability of green water in the region 
when compared with blue water. Gertan et al has produced close research into the relative abundance 
of green and blue water in the region, and the results are presented in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13: Green and Blue Water in the MENA Region 
 
Continued below… 
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N.B. This data covers selected MENA countries. 
The countries are presented in geographical 
order. 
 
Source: Based on Gerten D., Heinke J., Hoff H., 
Biemans H., Fader M., and Waha K. (2011), 
“Global water availability and requirements for 
future food production”, Journal of 
Hydrometeorology, Vol. 12, pp. 885-899. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, for some countries in the region, green water is a substantially more abundant resource than 
blue water. These countries are as follows: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Turkey, Iran, and to a 
lesser extent Jordan and Yemen. 
 
This paper’s research will rely heavily on datasets gathered by international bodies. The World Trade 
Organisation’s trade profiles provide statistics on “the structural trade situation of members, 
observers, and other selected economies”.35 These profiles give information on the top imported and 
exported agricultural commodities by country, the value of these trades in US dollars, and the sector’s 
contribution to national GDP. The World Bank gives information sourced from the UN’s AQUASTAT 
organisation, which offers datasets regarding water availability, water usage, water allocation, 
irrigated area, and a range of other related statistics.36 The UN’s Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO) runs a statistical forum called FAOSTAT, which gives comprehensive information about the 
quantities of traded agricultural products – exported and imported, by country, by year, and by type 
of commodity.37 
 
The following empirical chapter will argue that the MENA region’s integration into the virtual water 
trade has involved a significant opportunity cost. High investments in agriculture in the region have 
been used to produce goods that can be sold to boost exports, but which involve the low-value loss 
of quantities of high-value blue water – a situation that has only occurred economically because of a 
                                                          
35 World Trade Organisation (WTO), Trade Profiles, 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFHome.aspx?Language=E, accessed 13/1/2017. 
36 Food and Agricultural Organisation (FA0) / AQUASTAT, Database, 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/, accessed 13/1/2017. See also, World Bank, World 
Development Indicators: Freshwater, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5, accessed on 29/11/2016. 
37 Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) / FAOSTAT, Database, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data, 
accessed 13/1/2017. 
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failure to price water effectively or to incorporate that price into goods. This paper will attempt to 
assess the opportunity cost of these failures for the MENA region. This paper will then make a second 
argument: the fact that the MENA region is increasingly dependent on imported virtual water to meet 
its basic food needs means that the water under-pricing and misallocation assessed and costed in our 
first argument is able to continue unchallenged. This is because hidden virtual water reliance 
backgrounds wasteful water policies, and major (but short-term) water engineering projects allow 
these policies to continue by postponing the day of reckoning for these allocations that will come 
when the water finally runs out. 
 
This second argument requires us to explore a little further the academic literature on the subject of 
the management of water resources in the MENA region, and why misallocation should be pressed to 
continue. The power of water allocation as a political tool to curry favour with important interest 
groups is critical to the reasons that such water allocations are very difficult to challenge. Elhadj, in his 
article already discussed in this paper, highlights three motivations in the Saudi case study for the 
state decisions that allowed the extensive allocation of water to farming. These motivations are 
indicative of the general motivations in the MENA region: the unrealistic “nationalist appeal” of food 
independence; the enrichment of powerful elites that “support the 4,000 or so members of the ruling 
family in return for privileges and benefits”; and the settlement of the Bedouins – the final motivation 
being more specific to the Saudi case but nonetheless with parallels in other countries across the 
region.38 
 
The “nationalist appeal” of food independence has been noted by many scholars as a motivation for 
agricultural policy (with its obvious effects on water allocation policy) in many MENA countries 
including Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, and Israel, while the enrichment of important elites is also 
a powerful lens through which to view the agricultural policies of MENA states. The involvement of 
politically important national elites in agricultural production and major irrigation (i.e. water access) 
projects has been the subject of much scholarship and discussion throughout the region, including in 
relation to Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Indeed, Yemen presents an interesting case 
study, and scholarship has been conducted by Christopher Ward of the universities of Oxford and 
Exeter that demonstrates just how politically valuable agricultural and water allocation policies are – 
and the consequent difficulties of challenging them.39 
 
In Yemen, Ward has investigated how water, land, and agricultural subsidy have been important to 
the central Government’s ability to appease powerful constituencies and to ensure the overlapping 
circles of society (in a country with very many circles of society) centre upon and revolve around the 
authority of the state. In a country with a historically weak central government, such examples of 
appeasement have been critical, but the result is that Yemen allocates 91 percent of its annual water 
use to agriculture (see Appendix A: Figure A1) – worse than that, it allocates 44 percent of this (so, 40 
percent of its annual water use) to the growing of qat, a mildly narcotic substance of no nutritional 
value at all.40 Qat has grown in popularity, and the area of land on which it is cultivated in Yemen has 
                                                          
38 Elhadj, Elie, “Camels don’t fly, deserts don’t bloom”. For food independence see pp. 32-33; for enrichment 
of elites see pp. 33-35; for settlement of the Bedouin see p. 33. 
39 Ward, Christopher, “The Political Economy of Irrigation Water Pricing in Yemen”, in The Political Economy of 
Water Pricing Reforms, ed. Ariel Dinar, (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp. 381-394. 
40 See Marshall, Tim, “Qat: Legal High is Fuelling Extremism”, Sky News, 15/1/2010, 
http://news.sky.com/story/752130/yemen-legal-high-is-fueling-extremism, accessed 14/1/2017. From Figure 
A1 in Appendix A, we see that Yemen withdraws 3.6 billion cubic metres of freshwater per year, of which 91 
percent (3,276,000,000 cubic metres) is allocated to agriculture. Of the 3.6 billion total withdrawn, 40 percent 
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risen from 8,000 hectares in 1970 to 103,000 hectares in the year 2000.41 The reason for this is clear: 
economic benefit. Major landowners are able to draw an annual income of 2.5 million Yemeni rials 
(9,990 USD) per hectare of cultivated qat, while cultivated fruits will draw an income of just 570,000 
rials (2,278 USD) per hectare – a fifth of the value.42 The allocation of resources to the cultivation of 
qat has greatly benefited powerful constituencies within Yemen, and the situation has been heavily 
supported by government policies which have shielded domestic producers from foreign competition 
– such as a ban on cheaper Kenyan imports of qat. Such government subsidy and shielding has not 
only occurred in Yemen, of course, but across the MENA region, and for many agricultural products – 
fruits, vegetables, staple crops, livestock. This pattern of government support for agricultural practice 
and consequent water allocation to agriculture is well recognised within the academic literature as 
occurring across the region. In the case of Saudi Arabia, indeed, but applicable to the whole Middle 
East and North Africa, Elhadj writes: 
 
“What was the instrument that enabled this situation to develop? The answer is that 
it developed as a result of government subsidies to desert irrigation. Subsidies 
distort the efficient workings of markets. They cause resources to be 
misallocated”.43 
 
 
This interpretation is of course based on liberal economic theory, and alternative interpretations of 
the mechanisms for misallocation will be found in Marxist and nationalist theories of economics. 
However, the end result of misallocation – and indeed the influence of subsidies (whatever their cause 
or motivation) – is hardly unclear. 
 
Christopher Ward traces how the Yemeni Government has since the turn of the millennium embarked 
upon a programme of adjustment under the auspices of international bodies such as the World Bank, 
and has attempted not only a widespread registration of wells but also reforms to water pricing policy 
to correct two decades (at least) of water under-pricing. Water pricing reform has been politically 
stressful in Yemen because it has removed water allocation as a lever of appeasement, as a grace and 
favour of the central government. As Ward wrote in 2000, “the result could be the strengthening of 
regional power bases, a centrifugal tendency that is ever-present in Yemeni politics”.44 In 2016/7, we 
see that Yemen’s centrifugal tendencies have torn the country into factionalism, civil war, and a severe 
food and water crisis. 
 
The political stress of challenging water allocations that benefit powerful constituencies has also 
formed a central part in the work of Michael Gilmont. His paper concentrates on the case study of 
Israel and he applies for the first time the theory of decoupling specifically to the water allocation 
sector. Gilmont’s theory of water decoupling has been developed from previous applications of the 
                                                          
(1,440,000000 cubic metres) is allocated to growing qat (see Marshall). This allocation to qat is 44 percent of 
the allocation to agriculture. 
41 The Encyclopedia of Yemen (in Arabic) (2nd ed.). Alafif Cultural Foundation. 2003. pp. 2309–2314. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Elhadj, Elie, “Camels don’t fly, deserts don’t bloom”, p. 36. 
44 Ward, Christopher, “Irrigation Water Pricing in Yemen”, in The Political Economy of Water Pricing Reforms, 
ed. Ariel Dinar, Published for the World Bank, (OUP: Oxford, 2000), p. 392. 
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term in several areas including economic theory45 and neo-institutionalism.46 Decoupling describes 
the creation of political / economic / sociological “space”, and is the process of influence becoming 
remote between two variables or institutions. Decoupling as a concept has been applied to 
environmental resources since the early 1990s, and the “space” it refers to in this context has been 
defined in economic terms: Decoupling describes “the separation of resource use from economic 
growth”.47 That is, a resource-decoupled economy can enjoy economic growth and resilience in spite 
of its natural resource constraints. In 2011, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
released a report entitled Decoupling Natural Resource Use and Environmental Impact from Economic 
Growth which explored this concept further.48 Gilmont has taken the idea of environmental 
decoupling and applied it specifically to water resource allocation, using the case study of Israel to 
develop a theory of water decoupling.49 He argues that successful water decoupling in Israel allowed 
the country between 2007 and 2010 to reduce natural water use by 20 percent “while maintaining 
overall supply volumes despite drought”,50 and while maintaining economic growth. 
 
Gilmont offers four stages of decoupling, which can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Economic decoupling: Economic diversification will reduce the national reliance on water-
intensive agriculture; 
 
• Trade-based decoupling: Involving the importing of virtual water in foodstuffs, this stage reduces 
domestic dependency on agricultural irrigation to put food on the shelves;  
 
• Efficiency-based decoupling: This stage includes greater efficiency in the agricultural sector, 
allowing a country to reduce its water needs still further; 
 
• Natural water decoupling: The water supply is increased without drawing more freshwater from 
the natural system. Used water is recycled, and desalinated water is introduced. 
 
                                                          
45 “Decoupling” is a concept used in financial and economic theory to describe a purported divorce of the 
fortunes of developing countries from those of developed ones. The idea of the marriage of these two sets of 
fortunes derives from a popular (though now outdated) assumption that poor countries principally sell to rich 
ones – while this was true under previous structures of imperial European economic organisation, today more 
than half of Third World trade is conducted within the developing world itself. Economists today argue that – 
owing to trade realities – there has been a separation in this relationship, creating a sort of “breathing space”. 
This process, in economics, is known as “decoupling”. See The Economist, “The Decoupling Debate”, 06/03/08, 
http://www.economist.com/node/10809267, accessed 28/11/16. 
46 In neo-institutional theory, which attempts to highlight sociological realities and relationships in the 
workings of institutions and how these interact with society, “decoupling” is about the creation of “space” 
between official policies and de facto organisational practices. 
47 Gilmont, Michael, “Decoupling dependence on natural water: Reflexivity in the regulation and allocation of 
water in Israel”, in Water Policy, 2013, p. 2. 
48 UNEP, 2011, “Decoupling Natural Resource Use and Environmental Impact from Economic Growth”, 
http://www.unep.org/resourcepanel/decoupling/files/pdf/decoupling_report_english.pdf, accessed 1/2/2017. 
49 Gilmont, “Decoupling dependence on natural water: Reflexivity in the regulation and allocation of water in 
Israel”, in Water Policy, 2013, p. 2. 
50 Ibid, p. 1. 
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These stages are presented in the order in which Israel embarked on them, but Gilmont emphasises 
that this order is not a rule.51 All of these stages, however, at one point or other, are necessary for a 
water stressed polity to undergo in order to decouple from water constraints. 
 
The process of decoupling is in part the process of challenging water misallocation, which means 
confronting the vested interests of powerful constituencies. The programme of reform in Yemen 
investigated by Ward represents an attempt to decouple in this sense. All countries in the region have 
engaged with trade-based decoupling, importing virtual water in food, but this stage is not that which 
carries political stress. As highlighted by the juxtaposition of Allan’s theory of the virtual trade with 
data showing the continuing water allocations to agriculture, a country may abandon the reality of 
food self-sufficiency by importing food (thus engaging in trade-based decoupling) while at the same 
time continuing with dramatic water misallocation to the agricultural sector. Economic decoupling 
involves challenging these allocations and is an extremely stressful procedure; Gilmont’s study of the 
experience of Israel shows how difficult it is to overcome the political power of existing water 
allocations. 
 
In order to maintain misallocation for the reasons given (and thus to avoid the stresses of decoupling), 
this paper will argue that the importing of virtual water “backgrounds” the policies of misallocation 
and the misallocation itself, by keeping food on the shelf in a politically-silent way, thus avoiding the 
headlines that would lead to discussion about water allocation to agriculture. Such a discussion might 
start from the following observation: “if we have secure food supplies filling our shelves, and coming 
from abroad, why is my family / industry water-stressed while we continue to allocate 85 percent of 
water to agriculture?” Governments do not have a democratically acceptable answer to such a 
question – to admit that water is squandered, leaked, and wasted upon the ground in order to support 
the wealth and position of landed interests – more than that, that the monies raised by taxes or the 
sale of natural resources are spent subsidising this practice of wasting water (as shown in the second 
empirical chapter) – is hardly an acceptable one, and in general it is best that the question is not asked 
in the first place. Thus, Tony Allan has proposed that reliance on virtual water itself is “backgrounded”, 
turning a “known” into an “unknown”: 
 
“[One] very uncomfortable “known” relevant to the region’s water security [is that] 
global trade in water intensive food commodities has mitigated what is a critical 
Middle-East-wide water crisis… Political processes can, and do, easily background 
destabilising “knowns””.52 
 
This deliberate backgrounding is not only to avoid the stated question being asked – it is also because, 
according to Allan, the global agricultural trade system on which this reliance is predicated is 
unsustainable owing to the practices of water under-pricing discussed previously. Thus, security 
cannot be guaranteed in an unsustainable system. Allan argues that virtual water reliance is 
backgrounded in part because of the unsustainability of the system on which it rests. Taking this 
further, it is the contention of this paper that it is virtual water reliance itself that backgrounds the 
unsustainability of water (mis-)allocation in the first place. 
 
In the course of preparing this paper, I attended two three-day conferences that have provided an 
insight into the up-to-date discussions and debate surrounding the issues of water management, 
                                                          
51 See Appendix B. 
52 Allan, Tony, “Middle East water security: Some knowns that have to be unknowns”, 2016, article in 
preparation for publishing by the London Middle East Institute (SOAS), by private correspondence. 
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reallocation, and decoupling. These conferences were well attended by academics – including 
Professor Tony Allan and Michael Gilmont, as well as the famous economist John Waterbury – and 
diplomats and politicians. The first was held at Wilton Park and convened by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, while the second was at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in 
London. I have provided a brief summary of each of these conferences in Appendix B, highlighting the 
content that dealt with the issues relevant to the arguments of this paper. At Wilton Park, the 
conference officially focussed on technological innovations that could assist in efficiency-based 
decoupling, but repeatedly the discussion was drawn to how efforts are being made by governments 
and NGOs to encourage societal, political, and economic changes that will permit changes to water 
allocation. 
 
Such social and grassroots innovations are considered among practitioners in water policy to be 
essential to an effective reorganisation of water management and allocation. Professor Allan at Wilton 
Park raised the issue of the absence of crucial stakeholder engagement however – namely, the 
involvement (or lack thereof) of the farmers who actually are responsible for water use. There was 
not a single farmer or farming representative present at either the Wilton Park or the SOAS 
conference, and I am informed that this is strongly the norm. While there were academics, engineers, 
and NGOs who do work directly with these grassroots, the absence of a voice directly from those 
people whose decisions determine irrigation practice, crop choice, waste or efficiency, and whose 
lives and livelihoods will be most immediately affected by water policy and availability change, was 
notable. Michael Gilmont has worked closely with farmers in Jordan to ascertain what water savings 
could be sustained while at the same time meeting said farmers’ economic needs, and such work is 
essential for finding a way for effective and long-term reallocation. My own work in the following 
section on the opportunity cost of agricultural allocation of water will demonstrate how valuable such 
savings and readjustments could be. However, it is seen in the academic (and journalistic) literature 
that neither governments nor international bodies give attention or funding to these essential types 
of grassroots-engaged research projects, and certainly do not – as shown by the absence of farming 
representatives at Wilton Park or SOAS – engage these grassroots in policy discussions and 
formulation. 
 
It was noted by Helen Lackner at the SOAS conference that only 10 percent of the World Bank’s 400 
million USD budget for development is allocated to water management and the environment, when 
these issues represent perhaps the biggest medium-to-long-term challenge for much of the 
developing world. The challenges related to water scarcity affect every aspect and sinew of political, 
social, and economic stability.53 At Wilton Park, delegates quizzed a World Bank representative on 
these very matters. International financial bodies such as the World Bank do not support low-level-
long-term grassroots engagement activities that have the potential to transform society, but on the 
contrary prefer to fund projects that are short term and have clearly defined outcomes – even though 
such outcomes are significantly limited in effectiveness. In fact, as this paper will argue, the types of 
                                                          
53 As mentioned previously, water stress has domino effects on all features of society, and has been 
convincingly linked in academic discourse to the current strife in the Middle East. Syria and Yemen show very 
present and real examples of how a failure to decouple stability from water resource constraints brings the risk 
of internal conflict. Water mismanagement and misallocation can have deadly effects in terms of social 
cohesion and government authority in water-scarce regions. The areas of strongest ISIS-support in Syria, in the 
north of the country around Raqqa, are those areas that have experienced the most devastating crop failures 
owing to drought and water mismanagement. See Wind, Ella, and Dahi, Omar, “Syria’s agricultural 
development: current realities and historical roots”, p.3. See also Appendix B. 
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projects that these bodies, and Middle Eastern governments themselves, do fund and support actually 
encourage continued misallocation and overuse of water resources. 
 
In the following two empirical chapters, this paper will present new research into the issues of water 
allocation and policy, drawing heavily on the scholarly opinions and work of others as highlighted and 
presented in this literature review. The background to this paper, it will be recalled, set the stage for 
taking a view of the status of water policy, allocation, scarcity, and the agricultural trade in the MENA 
region. This literature review has given an introduction to the research, debates, and consensus of 
scholarly opinion on these matters. Notions have been introduced, such as those of decoupling, green 
and blue water, virtual water, and backgrounding. The next chapter will investigate MENA and the 
agricultural trade, and will consider the opportunity cost of agricultural allocations in the MENA 
region. The following chapter will argue that virtual water imports and policies on water management 
act to background water scarcity and misallocation – resulting in a perpetuation of the short-sighted. 
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MENA and the Opportunity Cost of Agriculture 
 
Water is valuable, and where it is under-priced or not priced at all the excessive usage this can lead to 
will carry an enormous opportunity cost in areas of water scarcity. This has already been touched upon 
in some respects with regards to the cases of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. This chapter will investigate 
the opportunity cost of MENA’s agricultural sector, and specifically the opportunity cost or gain of the 
region’s into the global virtual water trade. This chapter will argue that although MENA is dependent 
on virtual water imports, the water it uses in agriculture and in exported agricultural goods compared 
to the amount of water – and type of water – it has access to means that the opportunity cost of the 
current model of MENA-agricultural-trade-integration is extremely high for the MENA region. This 
chapter will argue that despite the fact that net virtual water flows are into the MENA region, 
nonetheless net water benefit flows are out of the region. 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to answer two main research questions: 1. How has MENA integrated 
into the virtual water trade? 2. What is the opportunity cost of this integration (and of agricultural 
sector water allocations in general)? 
 
The types of food the MENA region grows and also exports is crucial to the magnitude of the 
opportunity cost for the region. It has been referred to that work by Gilmont and Nasser in Jordan has 
demonstrated an opportunity cost of water allocation to agriculture rather than industry is some 66.23 
USD per cubic metre (i.e. the difference between 66.25 and 1.02 USD), but this is of course an 
opportunity cost per unit of water, and not an overall estimation. The total annual opportunity cost 
can only be determined by looking at how much water the region allocates to agriculture in total, and 
this depends on factors such as crop choice and growing time (or indeed, livestock choice), climate, 
irrigation requirements, as well as leakage and wasteful water use. The FAO has completed a study of 
crop water needs,54 which demonstrates the impact of each of these factors on water requirements. 
Sunny, hot weather with a low humidity leads to the highest requirements for water, and in the MENA 
region low rainfall means that these requirements must be met by irrigation. The most water-intensive 
crops are rice and sugarcane, followed by crops such as wheat, barley, maize, and tomatoes. It is 
interesting that citrus fruits have among the lowest water requirements per day, but that owing to a 
longer growing time are among the more water-intensive crops. The FAO presents data for calculating 
water requirements of certain crops, which are included here in Appendix A as Figures A11 and A12. 
Calculations for crops requirements are given in relation to the water requirements for grass in the 
same climactic conditions. In temperate climates, grass will require as little as 4mm of freshwater 
across the growing area per day to grow, but in arid areas this requirement shoots up to 10mm per 
day, or higher. This means that wheat, for example (which requires 10 percent more water than grass 
– see Figure A11) will require 11mm across the growing area per day of freshwater, on average. For a 
growing area of 1 square metre, this is 0.011 cubic metres per day. Over the entire growing period of 
120 days (Figure A12), therefore, 1 square metre of wheat in a hot, dry climate will require 1.32 cubic 
metres of freshwater. In Saudi Arabia in 1992, 1,121,897ha of wheat and similar crops were 
harvested55 – that is, over 11.2 billion square metres, requiring over 14.8 billion cubic metres of water. 
In general, it is possible to grow 1 tonne of wheat per 2,000 square metres of cultivation, which 
                                                          
54 FAO, “Crop Water Needs”, http://www.fao.org/docrep/s2022e/s2022e02.htm, accessed 1/2/2017. 
55 Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) / FAOSTAT, Database, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data, 
accessed 13/1/2017. 
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requires 2,640 cubic metres of freshwater (in high-yield farming communities, this estimate comes 
down to 1 tonne of wheat per 1,000 square metres, requiring just 1,320 cubic metres of freshwater). 
 
I have previously noted that Elie Elhadj quotes water requirements for crops as being 2,000 cubic 
metres per tonne (Figure 8), which is very much in line with my own calculations above. Elhadj also 
suggested the livestock production carries a water burden of 16,000 cubic metres per tonne. 
 
The sort of food produced in the MENA region – both arable and pastoral – is the subject of much 
data. The FAO manages comprehensive datasets on crop and animal production by tonnage or head, 
as well as imports and exports. The region’s main producers of food are Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia, growing or otherwise producing wheat, sugarcane, tomatoes, potatoes, 
milk, chicken meat, and olives.56 It has been discussed that Saudi Arabia was once the world’s sixth 
largest exporter of wheat. Today, however, the country has reversed its policies supporting wheat 
production and export. From 2008, the Minister of Agriculture Waleed Al-Kuraiji announced that the 
country would reduce wheat production by 12.5 percent per annum,57 and would phase it out entirely 
by 2016. However, the Saudi government continues to promote its food producing sector, especially 
bovine and poultry production, and has invested heavily in agricultural land abroad – in Africa, Eastern 
Europe, and California – to secure food supplies both for its people and its pastoral farming industry.58 
It is noticeable that the foods listed as being the main products of the MENA region are all (with the 
exception of olives) with water requirements 10 or 20 percent higher than grass – that is, they are all 
highly water intensive products. In Jordan – a country which has seen sharp rises in its agricultural 
exports in recent years, one of the crops of choice is tomatoes, with a 10 percent greater water 
requirement than grass. Owing to a longer growing period of 135-180 days, this crop has a greater 
water burden than even wheat. Figure 14 below shows the rate of increase in this particular case study 
of this particular water-intensive luxury crop. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56 Al Masah Capital Limited, “MENA food security: Are we doing enough to feed the population?”, 2011, 
http://almasahcapital.com/uploads/report/pdf/report_20.pdf, accessed 07/12/2016. 
57 Al Arabiya English, “Saudi Arabia to stop wheat production by 2016”, by Fatima Muhammad, 11th December 
2014, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2014/12/11/KSA-to-stop-wheat-production-by-
2016.html, accessed 1/2/2017. 
58 Saudi Agricultural Exhibition in 2015 Highlights, http://saudi-agriculture.com/en-sa/about/about-saudi-
arabia, accessed 1/2/2017. 
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Figure 14: Tomato Production in Jordan, 1961-2011 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data from the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) / FAOSTAT, Database, 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data, accessed 13/1/2017 
 
 
Agriculture consumes 85 percent of the MENA region’s annual freshwater withdrawals. The farming 
of high-water intensity luxury crops such as tomatoes, and staple (but still extremely water intensive) 
crops such as wheat, is a massive reason for this overallocation to agriculture. It is shown in Figure 14 
above that much of the increase in tomato production has been driven by an increase in Jordan’s 
exports of tomatoes, and indeed this increase in the exporting of luxury food items from the region is 
a feature across the countries in the region, even as wheat production in a place such as Saudi Arabia 
is falling. In Syria, crop and sheep exports were extremely important for the economy before the civil 
war: “Syria was the world’s fifth largest olive exporter prior to 2011… and there are estimates of 15 
million heads of sheep even today, with the famous and expensive Oweis sheep trade being a big 
source of foreign exchange, bringing in 450 million [USD] annually”.59 The World Trade Organisation 
gives detailed information about the value of crops and animals exported from the region, and this 
data has been collated and presented in Appendix A: Figure A9. From this table, in general it seems 
that the most significant export products (in terms of value) for the MENA region are high-grade and 
water-intensive fruits and vegetables, such as citrus fruits, tomatoes, sugarcane, and in the case of 
Iran, nuts. Again, note that these are all crops with an extremely high water requirement (10 or 20 
percent higher than grass), and with relatively longer growing periods (refer to Appendix A: Figures 
A11 and A12). 
 
A study of Figures A9 and A10 shows that countries in the European Union are generally the single 
largest trading partner for the MENA region, particularly for countries in the Maghreb, while in the 
                                                          
59 Wind, Ella, and Dahi, Omar, “Syria’s agricultural development: current realities and historical roots”, p. 1. 
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Mashreq the United States, China, and others, take on a more prominent role. This is significant 
because these trading partners have access, in general, to considerably more renewable freshwater 
resources than the MENA region, and this fact has a major effect on the scale of opportunity cost for 
agricultural water allocation. The total value per annum of agricultural exports from the MENA region 
is 37.5 million USD, which is 24 percent of all exports. 
 
There has, of course, been significant progress in terms of reconfiguring the food security of the MENA 
region, though as I am showing this has not translated (with the earlier exception of Israel) into 
reductions in the water-burden of agriculture. Today, Saudi Arabia – like its regional partners and 
neighbours – imports the majority of its wheat and other staple crops. Wheat, maize, barley, raw 
sugar, rice, and chicken meat are the region’s main imports, coming from France, North America, 
Russia, Ukraine, Argentina, India, Brazil, and Australia. In terms of value, Figure A10 shows that the 
most consistently most important partner is again the European Union. MENA is “the largest grain 
importing region in the world… [it is] inherently dependent on imports to meet rising demand for food, 
particularly cereals”.60 According to Gilmont,61 Saudi Arabia, for example, is 67 percent food-import-
dependent, and this figure is growing (see Appendix B: Figure B1). The total value per annum of 
agricultural imports to the region is 119.4 million USD, which is 16 percent of all imports. Note that 
the list of main imports is also a list of relatively water-thirsty crops, generally with 10 or 20 percent 
higher water requirements than grass, although it is also important to remember that the import-
trade partners listed are generally (with the exception of Australia) in more temperate climactic zones. 
Grass in an arid or semi-arid zone can need up to or in excess of 10mm of freshwater across the 
cultivated area per day, whereas in a more temperate zone this requirement falls to between 4 and 
6mm. Thus, the daily requirement for wheat, as discussed earlier, falls from 11mm to as little as 
4.04mm per day. Not to mention that countries in the European Union (and Ukraine and Russia) have 
higher yields at harvest per hectare. Not to mention either that rainfall in temperate zones means that 
the majority of water that is required for crop growth can be sourced from the sky, by which I mean 
rain-fed agriculture. 
 
Data from the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, an office of the European 
Commission, supports the observation that the MENA region today primarily imports staple crops and 
exports luxury food items.62 The Directorate-General’s report lists the primary agricultural imports and 
exports in and out of the European Union from or to the MENA region. The flow of produce from the 
EU to the MENA region is dominated by staple crops such as wheat and various cereals (21.1 percent), 
while only about 5 percent of these EU-to-MENA flows consist of fruits and vegetables. In the reverse, 
62 percent of produce flowing from MENA to the EU consists of luxury fruits, vegetables, and their 
products. 
 
This paper has outlined that the way in which the MENA region circumnavigates its water shortage is 
by importing virtual water via the agricultural trade, as identified by Allan. These virtual water imports 
                                                          
60 Sadler, Marc, and Magnan, Nicholas, “Grain import dependency in the MENA region: Risk management 
options”, Farm D: Forum for Agricultural Risk Management in Development, 10/02/2011, p. 1, 
http://agriskmanagementforum.org/doc/grain-import-dependency-mena-region-risk-management-options, 
accessed 06/12/2016. 
61 Gilmont, Conference at SOAS. 
62 EU Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, “Agri-Food Trade Statistical Factsheet: Near 
and Middle Eastern Countries”, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/trade-
analysis/statistics/outside-eu/regions/agrifood-near-and-middle-eastern-countries_en.pdf, accessed 
1/2/2017. 
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are extremely important to the stability and water security of the region. The amount of virtual water 
the region imports is difficult to measure, but it has been shown that scholars have calculated that the 
region imported 248 billion cubic metres of water through the agricultural trade in 2010, including 
Turkey (see Figure 11). It has been shown in the literature review that 94 percent of this imported 
(agricultural) virtual water is green water, with the remainder being blue. The data we have introduced 
from AQUASTAT and the World Bank (regarding water resources and withdrawals) can now be 
investigated a little further, together with scholarly calculations of the water footprint of the MENA 
region. Water footprint, as has been noted, includes local water withdrawal and all virtual water 
imports, not only agricultural imports. Freshwater is crucially important to all aspects of an economy 
– agricultural, industrial, and domestic. The total water footprint of the MENA region has been 
calculated to be 546.9 billion cubic metres per annum (see Figure 7). The difference between water 
footprint and total water withdrawal is the reliance of a country or region on imported water, in all 
sectors. By referring to Appendix A: Figure A4, I have calculated that the MENA region’s reliance on 
imported water is 208.9 billion cubic metres per annum, or 278.8 billion cubic metres including Turkey. 
Thus, the difference between the figure of 248 billion calculated by scholars and that of 278.8 billion 
calculated by me is the reliance of the MENA region (including Turkey) on virtual water embedded in 
goods other than agricultural products – namely, 30 billion cubic metres per annum. It is important to 
remember that all figures relating to the virtual water content of products, the TRWR and IRWR of 
countries and regions, water footprints, as well as calculations of water withdrawals, are all educated-
best-guess-estimates. 
 
Where data is available, the total virtual water imports of countries in the MENA region is presented 
graphically in Figure 15 for the associated data, see Appendix A: Figure A5). 
 
 
Figure 15: Virtual Water Imports into MENA Countries and the MENA Region 
 
 
 
The countries with unavailable data have been excluded from this chart. 
Source: Appendix A: Figure A5. 
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Since the MENA region imports 248 billion cubic metres of agricultural virtual water but 278 billion 
cubic metres of virtual water altogether, MENA’s imports of virtual water are thus 89 percent resulting 
from the agricultural trade. Furthermore, 85 percent of the region’s water withdrawals are committed 
to the agricultural sector (Appendix A: Figure A1). We thus see how important this sector is when 
discussing the MENA water footprint. 
 
In order to consider the opportunity cost of agricultural water allocations it is necessary to study the 
added value involved in agricultural water use as well as that involved in other sectoral uses. It is well-
acknowledged (as we have seen in the literature review) that agricultural water use brings less 
economic benefit (i.e. has a lower added-value) than industrial water use. It should be noted that in a 
region such as MENA, where water is scarce and both water withdrawals and water footprint are well 
in excess of internal renewable water resources (refer again to Figure 7), the way in which every single 
unit of water is used is significant, and carries an opportunity cost. On the other hand, regions (such 
as MENA’s main agricultural trade partners) with an excess of renewable water availability compared 
to withdrawal and footprint have a type of “naturally-endowed decoupling” which means water 
allocation to a lower-added-value use carries little if any opportunity cost, and is neither here nor 
there when discussing the sustainability of water use. It has already been mentioned that trade 
partners in Europe, Ukraine, and Russia in particular have more temperate climates requiring less 
water for grass and agricultural crops, and higher rainfall to enable rain-fed agriculture to thrive. What 
blue water is used in irrigation is a small part of these countries’ renewable blue water availability. In 
the MENA region, on the contrary, the arid and semi-arid climate leads to thirstier crops, the lack of 
rainfall leads to greater blue water irrigation, and the fact that water withdrawals are significantly 
higher than renewable resources means that water is being extracted non-renewably from aquifers. 
Considering the vanishingly slow rates of recharge of these aquifers (refer to Figure FN1 on p.7), 
depletion of these resources carries a double opportunity cost for the future. 
 
MENA water allocations to the agricultural sector are presented in relation to allocations to other 
sectors (industrial and domestic) in Appendix A: Figure A7. The contribution of agriculture to GDP and 
the productivity of water (measured in value-added USD) is also displayed in Appendix A: Figure A6. 
Figure 16 below selects from the appended data the three countries with the highest water 
productivity rates in the MENA region and the four countries with the lowest, and shows their 
allocations to agriculture. 
 
 
Figure 16: Highest and Lowest Water Productivity in MENA, and allocation to agriculture 
 
 
 
Source: Appendix A Figure A7. 
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It is clear that there is a broad correlation between high allocation to agriculture and low water 
productivity. Indeed, this is generally true for all countries in the region, as demonstrated in the scatter 
graph in Figure 17: the data points closer to zero on the x-axis are generally further away from zero 
on the y-axis.  
 
 
Figure 17: MENA Water Productivity and Allocation to Agriculture 
 
 
 
Source: Appendix A: Figure A7. 
 
 
Israel is the most interesting example of the countries listed in Figure 16. It has a medium level (low 
for the region) of allocation to agriculture and a high rate of economic water productivity. It is an 
interesting case since it is the only one of the high-productivity countries listed in Figure 16 not to be 
a rentier economy that can rely upon significant fossil fuel deposits (which require water to extract) 
to boost its water productivity figures. On the contrary, its high water productivity rate vindicates the 
decoupling process discussed in the literature review. Israel allocates 6 percent and 36 percent of its 
water withdrawals to industry and domestic use respectively. Figure 18 is a scatter graph showing 
productivity in relation to industrial and domestic allocations in the region. 
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Figure 18: MENA Water Productivity and Allocation to Industry and Domestic 
 
 
Series 1: Industrial 
Series 2: Domestic 
 
Source: Appendix A: Figure A7 
 
 
It is interesting at this point briefly to consider the water allocations of rich industrialised countries in 
western Europe. Figure 19 highlights water productivity and sectoral allocation for four key western 
European countries. 
 
 
Figure 19: Water Use by Sector and Water Productivity (Selected Industrialised Countries) 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Freshwater, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5, accessed 
on 29/11/2016 
 
 
Clearly, renewable blue water allocations to agriculture in these countries are low, while allocations 
to industry are high. The United Kingdom bucks this trend somewhat, with low agricultural allocations 
and low industrial allocations. Nonetheless, the United Kingdom has by far the highest blue water 
productivity out of this sample – this is because, firstly, the absolute amount of blue water actually 
withdrawn is relatively low (the country has high levels of rainfall and so agriculture can rely on green 
water), and secondly the economy has diversified into service “industries”, primarily the legal and 
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financial sectors. Thus, the United Kingdom has a diversified and flexible economy without relying on 
a traditional industrial base with its heavy water requirements. 
 
The fact that agriculture represents the sector with the most visible and significant demands on 
freshwater withdrawals and use in developing countries is key to understanding the disparity in water 
productivity figures between rich and poor states. Low income countries globally see 90 percent of 
their water withdrawals attributable to the agricultural sector, whereas in high income countries this 
proportion is just 43 percent, with a considerably higher proportion going to industrial uses. 
 
Low industrial allocations and high agricultural allocations mean that economies across the MENA 
region are missing out on the added value of industrial water use. It has been shown that in the case 
study of Jordan, the difference in added value between agricultural and industrial water use is an 
estimated 66.23 USD per cubic metre of water (67.25 – 1.02 = 66.23), according to the calculations of 
Gilmont and Nasser. Note that in Figure 20 and Figure A8 calculations for the industrial value and 
agricultural value of water for the entire MENA have been presented. The GDP of the MENA region as 
a whole is 3.4405 trillion USD, and the agricultural contributions to that GDP is an average of 8.5 
percent, and so by arithmetic we see that the value of agriculture in the MENA region is 283.8 billion 
USD per annum. To gain this value, 287.3 billion cubic metres of water are allocated to agriculture 
every year, and so again by arithmetic we see that the value of water in agricultural allocation is 99 
cents per cubic metre. This of course does not account for any subsidies such as were investigated by 
Elhadj in relation to Saudi Arabia. By similar arithmetic, it is possible to calculate that the value of 
industrial water in the MENA region is 123.97 USD per cubic metre on average, though this figure is 
greatly inflated by the fossil fuel energy sector. 
 
 
Figure 20: Industrial and Agricultural Water Value 
 
 
 
 
 
N.B. Industrial water value here is inflated by allocation to the petroleum industry in certain countries. 
Agricultural water value here is deflated by water leakage, and includes both higher value agricultural exports 
and lower value production for the domestic markets. 
 
Sources: Based on data from: World Bank, GDP Data, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, 
accessed 1/2/2017; World Bank, World Development Indicators: Freshwater, 
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5, accessed on 29/11/2016. 
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To allocate scarce water to agriculture rather than industry thus represents an enormous opportunity 
cost in the here and now, especially as MENA agricultural allocations are so high in part at least 
because of wasteful and inefficient farming practices – Gilmont and Nasser have found that farmers 
in Jordan could produce the same quantity of food while saving 191 million cubic metres of water per 
annum if they introduced more efficient technologies, seed choices, and practices (see Appendix B). 
Using Gilmont and Nasser’s calculations of agricultural and industrial water value in Jordan specifically, 
if this water were to be diverted to the industrial sector then it could be worth up to 12.9 billion USD 
to the Jordanian economy, as opposed to a value of 195 million USD in its current usage. This is an 
immediate opportunity cost of 12.7 billion USD, in a country with a GDP of 33.7 billion USD. There is 
also a problem in the agricultural sector of leakage in irrigation systems and pipelines. To continue 
with Jordan as a case study, 76 million cubic metres of freshwater are lost every year to leaks in that 
country.63 This is enough water to meet the annual water needs of 44,700 people, and, if committed 
in its entirety to industrial use could be valued at 5.1 billion USD. Again, this is an enormous 
opportunity cost in water use and waste in a country that has very little of either water or economic 
security. 
 
The difference in added value between industrial and agricultural water use, and thus the opportunity 
cost of agricultural blue water use, is more complex than the above statistics suggest. In the case study 
of Saudi Arabia, it was shown that in fact government subsidies were such that the country actually 
paid 1.98 USD for every cubic metre allocated to agriculture, which is masked by the (albeit meagre) 
added value of between 0.12 and 0.68 USD per cubic metre implied by trade figures (see Figure A8 for 
the upper estimate of 0.68 USD). 
 
The MENA region has access to just 3.3 percent of the renewable blue water of Europe. Europe has 
access to 7,070.9 billion cubic metres annually, but withdraws only 7.4 percent of this, while MENA 
has access to 232 billion cubic metres and withdraws 138.4 percent of this. Furthermore, it was shown 
in the literature review that the MENA region exports 5 billion cubic metres of blue water annually, 
and imports 16 billion cubic metres (see Figure 11). It seems to be the case based on these figures that 
the MENA region has a rum deal when it comes to the flows of virtual water. Scholars have indeed 
noted that the MENA region makes water savings of between 10 and 75 percent per year owing to 
the virtual water trade.64 Yet, Figure 7 illustrates that the MENA water footprint (i.e. even including 
virtual water imports) is significantly lower than the amount of water needed by the region to avoid 
water stress, as per the Falkenmark indicator. This is a fact that hardly sits easily with the idea that the 
MENA region’s integration into the global virtual water trade is a rum deal for the region. If we 
consider the statistics presented in this paragraph, and assume (incorrectly, but for the sake of 
simplicity) that all of the region’s blue virtual water imports come from Europe, this would mean that 
while the MENA region is exporting 5 billion cubic metres of blue water annually, or 3.6 percent of its 
total renewable blue water, its European trade partners are exporting to MENA less than 0.023 
percent of their own renewable blue water resources. 
 
                                                          
63 Mercy Corps, “Tapped out: Water scarcity and refugee pressures in Jordan”, 2014, 
https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/MercyCorps_TappedOut_JordanWaterReport_March204.pdf. 
Mercy Corps estimated in 2014 that 76 million cubic metres are lost to leaky pipes (8.4% of the total 
withdrawal of 900 million cubic metres). In some northern governorates the leakage rate is close to 70%. 
64 Chapagain, AK, Hoekstra, AY, and Saveniji, HHG, “Saving water through global trade”, Value of Water 
Research Report Series No. 17, (Delft: UNESCO-IHE, 2005), www.waterfootprint.org/reports/report17.pdf, 
accessed 4/2/2017. 
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It has been briefly mentioned that the bounty in Europe (as an example of one of the main agricultural 
trading partners of the MENA region) of renewable blue water means effectively that there is no 
opportunity cost to the use of the same in agriculture, since any increase in demand from another 
sector can easily be made up by existing unused renewable water resources.65 Thus, the MENA 
region’s imports of 16 billion cubic metres of blue water per annum carries a “here and now” 
opportunity cost for MENA’s trade partners of roughly 0 USD.66 The use of green water in agriculture 
also carries no opportunity cost since this is its only possible economic use. Thus, the 232 billion cubic 
metres of green water that the MENA region imports per annum (see Figure 11) carries an opportunity 
cost for the exporting trade partners of exactly 0 USD. The MENA region exports 18 billion cubic metres 
of green water per annum, which also carries an opportunity cost for the MENA region of 0 USD. 
However, when the MENA region exports 5 billion cubic metres of blue water per annum, this carries 
for the region a significant “here and now” opportunity cost, as well as a double opportunity cost for 
the future in so far as those resources are non-renewable. 
 
To calculate the “here and now” opportunity cost of the exporting of 5 billion cubic metres per annum 
from the MENA region is simply a matter of arithmetic, in the same way that opportunity costs were 
calculated in the Jordanian example above. From Figure 20 we have a MENA-wide industrial water 
value of 123.97 USD per cubic metre, and an agricultural water value of 0.99 USD per cubic metre. 
Thus, to allocate 5 billion cubic metres to industry would have a value of 620 billion USD, while to 
allocate this to agriculture (as happens in truth) has a value of 4.95 billion USD. Thus, this is an 
opportunity cost of 615.05 billion USD. However (and this is crucial), these figures give an average and 
– as mentioned as a note to Figure 20 – the industrial value is inflated by the petroleum industry in 
certain countries and the agricultural value is deflated by water leakage and low-value production for 
the domestic markets. If we consider that the MENA region’s agricultural exports are worth 37.504 
billion USD per year (Appendix A: Figure A9), then dividing this by 5 billion cubic metres gives us a 
water value of 7.50 USD per cubic metre of freshwater allocated to agriculture for export – not 0.99 
USD. However, while this assists us in negotiating the fact that MENA agricultural exports are higher 
value products, it leads us to a new problem of concealing water leakage, which surely occurs in 
irrigation of crops for export, and which is not covered by the blue virtual water export figures. Thus, 
water value per cubic metre for freshwater allocated to crops for export falls in between 0.99 and 7.50 
USD. We have already calculated that the high figure for opportunity cost (based on the lower limit 
value for agricultural water) is 615.05 billion USD per annum. We can now calculate that the low figure 
for opportunity cost (based on the upper limit value for agricultural water) is 582.5 billion USD per 
annum. If we also factor in the fact that the industrial valuation of 123.97 USD per cubic metre is high 
based on the oil and gas wealth of a handful of countries, and instead use Gilmont’s estimate of 67.25 
USD industrial value (alongside the higher value of agricultural water for export of 7.50 USD) we reach 
a lower limit to the annual opportunity cost of exporting blue water of 293.6 billion USD. We can 
calculate by similar arithmetic that the upper limit for the opportunity cost for the entire MENA 
agricultural sector per annum is 35 trillion USD per year, based on the highest possible industrial-use 
value (oil and gas) and the lowest possible agricultural-use value. The lower limit, based on Gilmont’s 
                                                          
65 Of course, this statement is a massive oversimplification because both water needs and water demands are 
local, not continental, and water stress is certainly part of life in southern Spain, for example. 
66 An important caveat to this is that, as per fn. 60 above, water stress is often localised, in spite of a national 
or continental surplus of water. For example, Saudi Arabia is investing in Californian land to grow and then 
import Lucerne / Alfalfa to support its own domestic cattle industry as feed. Lucerne is one of the most water-
intensive crops, and California one of the driest states, relying significantly on non-renewable aquifers. The 
opportunity cost to the MENA region’s trade partner in this instance is significant. 
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value figures for Jordan (a typical non-oil state), still yields an annual opportunity cost of some 19 
trillion USD. 
 
Blue water resources used in the MENA region are on average one-third non-renewable – and in some 
countries this figure is significantly higher (calculated from Figures A4 and A5). Thus, any overall 
approximation of the opportunity cost of agricultural water allocation and agricultural exports must 
also incorporate the implications for financial return in the future. The “here and now” opportunity 
cost can be applied in perpetuity to the renewable portion of blue water use, but can only be applied 
to the third (at least) that is non-renewable for as long as that water lasts – as few as 50 years by some 
estimates. The use of such non-renewable resources on extremely low-value and transitory economic 
activity (that is, the agricultural sector), will carry enormous opportunity costs for the future, well 
beyond the exhaustion of the resource. In truth, it is impossible to calculate these opportunity costs, 
not least because certain countries rely on non-renewable resources for far more than just one third 
of their supply. Saudi Arabia, for example, has just 2.4 billion cubic metres of freshwater renewably 
available, and pumps 21.3 billion cubic metres non-renewably every year (Appendix A: Figures A4 and 
A5). When this runs out, the country will be faced with the costs of increasing virtual water imports, 
increasing desalination (which is both energy and financially expensive), and perhaps even importing 
liquid water by pipeline or freight. And when its oil runs out to pay for these things and to power the 
desalination facilities cheaply, the results – social, political, and economic – could well be catastrophic. 
In Yemen, as was briefly mentioned in the literature review, and in Syria, and in other countries in the 
region as is mentioned in Appendix B, a failure to decouple, and then the water running dry, can 
contribute to devastating results. Social and political collapse makes an opportunity cost incalculable. 
 
For now, the annual opportunity cost has been estimated within upper and lower limits, and these are 
presented in Figure 21. The first table breaks down the opportunity cost to the MENA region of 
exporting virtual water embedded in agricultural goods. It also presents an estimate of the 
opportunity cost for those trade partners that export to the MENA region – and this estimate is based 
on the claim that these regions largely underexploit their renewable freshwater resources, meaning 
that any increased demand from more profitable sectors for water could easily be met by unused 
renewable resources, as argued earlier. This first table of Figure 21 shows that the opportunity costs 
for the MENA region in the current model of virtual-water-trade integration are higher than for its 
trade partners – thus, while virtual water flows into the region, the benefits of water use flow out of 
the region. The second table shows the upper and lower limits of my estimate for the opportunity cost 
of water allocation to the entire MENA agricultural sector. 
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Figure 21: Opportunity cost of agriculture 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to calculate the opportunity cost of MENA agricultural 
allocations and agricultural exports. This attempt has not been made previously in the literature. 
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The Perpetuation of Misallocation 
 
This paper has investigated the integration of the MENA region into the global agricultural trade, and 
has shown that the region’s agricultural policies carry a high opportunity cost in terms of its water use, 
since scarce water is allocated to low-value agriculture rather than high-value industry. At least a third 
of this allocated water across the region is non-renewable, thus incurring a double opportunity cost 
by hampering the potential for future economic diversification and stability. This paper will now argue 
that the region’s reliance on imported virtual water backgrounds and conceals policies of water 
mismanagement and misallocation – policies which are then perpetuated by nationally and 
internationally funded major water engineering projects that prolong unsustainable practices. 
 
Short-sighted water allocations to low-value agricultural usage should be challenged in a water 
stressed region such as the Middle East, but in fact they are not being so challenged. On the contrary, 
governments in the region and their financial and political backers worldwide are promoting an 
agenda that perpetuates misallocation. From trade deals to expansions in irrigation, to engineering 
projects to bring more and more aquifers on-line, finance and political effort is expended not in 
confronting the stressful but ultimately necessary process of decoupling, but on projects and deals 
that continue to support unsustainable water allocations, hiding the need for decoupling in the first 
place. That is the argument of this chapter, and examples will be drawn from Jordan, Syria and the 
Levant, as well as Libya, to demonstrate that water misallocation is propped up and backgrounded in 
order to secure its perpetuation. This chapter essentially traces the avoidance of decoupling in the 
region. 
 
It is possible to background water misallocation and agricultural waste because the virtual water 
reliance that does the backgrounding is itself backgrounded by political processes, as identified by 
Allan and discussed in the literature review. The silent importing of virtual water keeps food on the 
shelves while agricultural productivity continues half-noticed but comforting in its presence for 
citizens, reassuring for governments, and profitable for elites. The myth of food self-sufficiency 
continues unchallenged, and so does the scandalous allocation of 85 percent of scarce water resources 
to agriculture – irrigating inefficient crop types, being lost to leakage, irrigating food for export, and 
generally being wasted, as demonstrated throughout this thesis. The political motivations for such a 
continuation have been discussed previously. It is unnoticed and unchallenged, but it is propped up 
and perpetuated by very large and headline policies – new trade deals to export even more agricultural 
goods, major engineering projects to tap aquifers for another decade’s supply of water, and so on, as 
explored below. Such large, well-funded, and well-publicised projects allow governments in the region 
to claim boldly and loudly: “We are dealing with the water shortage crisis! We are taking large steps 
with these large projects! We are investing, building, we are mastering our future!” Yet, all they are 
really doing is perpetuating water misallocation and waste, and distracting attention away from their 
failures to decouple. This point could be the subject of an extensive thesis focused on the discourse 
of the matter, and this is a potential area for further research, but for now, for the purposes of this 
paper, I will simply outline some of the major projects and policies that are propping up the status quo 
of agricultural water waste in the region. 
 
The Jordanian government is currently implementing some of the region’s most extensive water 
engineering projects to ensure continued access to freshwater resources for the agricultural sector, 
and is doing so with significant international funding. The government announced plans in August 
2014 to increase water storage by 25 percent over the following five years through the construction 
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of new dams and ponds to harvest rainwater. For example, construction on an 11 million JD (15.5 
million USD) dam – the Wadi Al Karak dam – began in October 2014, and this will provide water for 
local irrigation projects and livestock, benefiting around 5,000 farmers in the Karak area. Although this 
targets the harvesting of rainwater, it is not green water that is being harvested, but blue, and it thus 
carries with it the associated environmental and opportunity costs.67 The US Department of 
Agriculture has provided 7.5 million JD (10.5 million USD) as a grant to help construct the 2 million 
cubic metres dam, with one of the main aims being to boost agricultural exports. 
 
Another major water engineering project which the Jordanian government is promoting (and which 
international funders such as the World Bank are sponsoring) is the Disi Water Conveyance Project. 
The Disi aquifer is located in porous sandstone between 500 and 1000 metres under the ground in the 
south of Jordan. It is a transboundary resource shared with Saudi Arabia – indeed, 90 percent of this 
substantial “fossil” aquifer lies beneath Saudi territory. The aquifer holds (in total) some 22 billion 
cubic metres of freshwater (of which 2.2 billion is Jordan’s geographical allocation), which filtered 
down to it 30,000 years ago. The aquifer has an annual recharge rate of 50 million cubic metres, but 
extraction rates in recent years have been about 80 million cubic metres on the Jordanian side and (in 
2004) 800 million cubic metres on the Saudi side, with waters being allocated primarily to agriculture. 
At this rate, and taking into consideration recharge, the entire aquifer will have been depleted in 26 
years. The Jordanian government has built a 340 km (210 mile) “King Abdullah” pipeline to transport 
water pumped from this aquifer to water-scarce Amman, opened in July 2013. This mega-project will 
see up to 100 million cubic metres pumped and transported every year. The annual extraction will 
very soon amount to 900 million cubic metres – meaning that the aquifer will be depleted in just over 
24 years. Jordan plans to pump from this aquifer for 20-25 years, or until the country’s third big water 
engineering project, the Red Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance project, is at full capacity. 
 
Jordan’s third current major water engineering project being pursued with international funding, 
allowing the Jordanian government to distract attention from the real crisis which is one of water 
misallocation and not supply, is the Red Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project. Desalination 
facilities at Aqaba will draw water from the Red Sea to provide (in the first instance, under an 
agreement signed in 2015) 80 million cubic metres of potable water per year, of which Israel will 
purchase half at cost, with the remainder staying in Jordanian control and being allocated largely to 
agriculture. In the process of desalination, it is typical that 3 parts of seawater will undergo reverse 
osmosis to produce 1 part of potable water and 2 parts of saltier brine. In the case of the Aqaba 
desalination plant, the 2 parts left over – instead of being dumped back into the sea (which is the usual 
outlet) will instead be transported by pipeline northwards to be dumped instead in the shrinking Dead 
Sea. This amounts to about 300 million cubic metres per year, though future expansion plans envisage 
2 billion cubic metres being transported in this way, with the additional potable water produced going 
again largely to agriculture. This plan to refill the Red Sea has been criticised on ecological grounds, 
and it has been claimed that scientific tests have been fudged and bypassed for political purposes to 
                                                          
67 The dams that have already been built along the tributaries of the River Jordan over many years have had 
the effect that only 10 percent of what once flowed into the Dead Sea in the early 1960s now reaches that end 
point. The Jordan River has seen its flow reduced by 90%, from 1.5 billion cubic metres per year to just 100 
million cubic metres per year – most of which is brackish water and sewage. The Dead Sea, which loses more 
than 300 million cubic metres per year to natural evaporation, is also subject to direct extractions by the Israeli 
and Jordanian potash industries (another input to agriculture) amounting to between 250 and 280 million 
cubic metres per year. The Dead Sea has lost 30% of its surface area over the past 20 years, and its level is 
falling by over a metre per year. Building a dam upstream is not a harmless action for the management of 
water resources. 
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get the project approved. The fact is, though, that the fundamental issues of water mismanagement 
and misallocation continue. The consequence of projects such as this and the two previously 
mentioned is the undermining of incentive and opportunity to diversify the economy. 
 
The cases in Jordan have been highlighted above because they are recent, very significant, and are 
continuing regardless of the current political strife in the region. Another major example exists in 
Libya, however, though the current state of affairs in that country (and the British and French bombing 
of water-pipeline factories in 2011 – a felix culpa, perhaps, in terms of water resources) have 
somewhat disrupted the project. The brainchild of Colonel Ghadaffi, the Great Man-Made River 
Project, on which work started in 2006, was intended to consist (and may still yet) of a 2,333 mile 
network of pipes carrying water from four major underground aquifers in southern Libya to the 
northern population centres. Along the way, taps would allow farmers to utilise the water network in 
their fields. It has been called the “largest irrigation project in the world”, and would increase Libya’s 
extraction from the southern aquifers from 2.5 million cubic metres per day to 6.5 million per day.68 
Of this, 70 percent is expected to go to agriculture, 30 percent to domestic use, and there is no 
industrial allocation. With this “fossil” water, the Government planned to develop 160,000 hectares 
(1.6 million square metres) of farmland. Professor Aaron Wolf, Chairman of the Department of 
Geosciences at Oregon State University, has commented that “this is pretty expensive water. It’s not 
as expensive as desalinated water, but to irrigate with it is probably not cost effective in the purest 
sense”.69 
 
Based on the given extraction figures, the aquifer system could be depleted in 60-100 years. The 
Libyan government prior to its collapse was planning to deplete an ancient aquifer resource in one of 
the most water-stressed countries in the world in the space of a few decades, and all for the sake of 
agricultural irrigation. As a country, it found itself running out of freshwater, and its solution was not 
to challenge its 83 percent allocation to agriculture but to seek additional water supplies to expand 
irrigation. 
 
The support and expansion of irrigation in Libya, Jordan, and across the region is further promoted by 
trade deals to secure increasing agricultural exports. Libya’s policy was to overcome the need to 
import wheat, oats, corn, and barley, and then to establish an export presence in new markets in 
Europe.70 This is in a country with renewable water resources of 111.5 cubic metres per person. For 
Jordan, the troubles in Syria have disrupted the overland routes to the largest markets for Jordanian 
agricultural exports (Syria and the Gulf have typically been the destination for 80 percent of Jordanian 
agricultural exports) but instead of taking the opportunity to restructure and decouple it has been 
national policy to seek out additional markets to make up for the loss – in 2014, the Jordanians 
successfully targeted Russia for a trade deal, with Russia agreeing to reduce agricultural tariffs on 
Jordanian goods to 25 percent during the summer and 0 percent in winter.71 The Jordanian Ministry 
of Agriculture estimated in 2014/15 that agricultural exports would rise to 1 million tonnes, and in 
2015 agricultural exports reached 1.554 billion USD (Appendix A: Figure A9). The biggest single factor 
                                                          
68 BBC, “Libya’s thirst for fossil water”, by John Watkins, 18th March 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4814988.stm accessed 1/2/2017. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Oxford Business Group, “Jordan agriculture exports on the rise”, 22/01/2015, 
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/jordan-agriculture-exports-rise, accessed 07/12/2016. 
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in this was that vegetable export earnings rose by 35 percent, which was “attributed to farmers 
exporting higher value crops”.72 
 
In Egypt, policies have seen “a nationwide emphasis on land reclamation for agricultural 
development”.73 In Syria, again prior to the collapse of the state, vast semi-arid areas around the 
Euphrates and Khabur rivers were transformed from gentle grazing lands to irrigated high-intensity 
arable farming fields, with the effect that the water tables ran dry and the drought that came in 2006-
10 was exacerbated.74 In Saudi Arabia, it has been shown that wheat production led to the country 
becoming the world’s sixth largest exporter of the crop in the early 1990s, and despite the clear 
environmental costs of this there was no orchestrated policy to reduce wheat production until 2008 
when over 2 million tonnes were still being produced per annum. Throughout the region trade deals 
are sought to increase the export of agricultural produce, drawing increasingly from the non-
renewable aquifer resources that could be a blessing for the future of the region but are instead being 
squandered. 
 
Trade deals and major water supply initiatives allow the continuation of wasteful water practices. The 
engineering cases discussed above are essentially all projects with the same objective: To resolve 
water shortage by increasing non-renewable supply rather than embarking on a politically stressful 
programme of decoupling. Trade deals then help to keep the sector “profitable” for those who make 
use of the subsidised inputs such as water. I have already discussed the issue of the opportunity cost 
of this practice. Professor Stephen Lonergan of the University of Victoria, Canada, writes that “the 
main concerns with any non-renewable resource are the depletion rate and the dependency that is 
built up by using the resource. The knock-on effect of these projects is that once the water runs out, 
there is a dependency that can only be met in the future by desalination or importing water. Projects 
like this create a legacy that may have short term gains but ultimately makes the country or region 
very vulnerable in the future”.75 As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the long-term opportunity 
costs of non-renewable water resources running out are incalculable. 
 
Pumping aquifers and increasing water supply are projects that wallpaper over the cracks in water 
security, but do not offer a longer-term solution. Such projects are headline activities that play an 
important role in side-lining the real issues. Such things are backgrounded by the virtual water reliance 
that is itself backgrounded. Agriculture in the region is thus dependent on a bounty that will, in the 
fullness of time, run dry. 
 
This chapter has introduced the idea that the proclaimed attempts to deal with water scarcity (or 
economic weakness) in the MENA region are actually prolonging unsustainable water use practices. 
This is a contribution to scholarly understanding of water scarcity and government action in the MENA 
region, and develops the theory of virtual water backgrounding. 
                                                          
72 Ibid. 
73 Oxford Business Group, Egypt, 2016, https://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/egypt-2016/agriculture-0, 
accessed 1/2/2017. 
74 Carnegie Middle East Centre, “Drought, Corruption, and War: Syria’s Agricultural Crisis”, by Aron Lund, 18th 
April 2014, http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/55376, accessed 1/2/2017. 
75 Libya's Qaddafi taps 'fossil water' to irrigate desert farms, Sarah A. Topol, 23/10/2010, accessed 29/1/2017, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0823/Libya-s-Qaddafi-taps-fossil-water-to-irrigate-desert-
farms 
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Conclusion 
This paper initially presented a background to the issues of water stress and scarcity in the Middle 
East and North Africa. The fact that water stress is exacerbated by government policies – in particular 
water allocation to agriculture – has formed a central thread in this paper’s understanding of the 
region’s water stress conditions, the need for decoupling, and the region’s reluctance to reform. I 
considered the academic literature on these topics, ranging from theories of green and blue water, 
decoupling, backgrounding, and the virtual water trade. 
 
I then investigated how the MENA region has integrated into the virtual water trade – what does it 
buy and sell, and with whom does it trade? Generally, luxury crops are exported and staple crops 
imported, and the region exports a far greater proportion of its available blue water resources than 
do its trade partners. An attempt was made to quantify the opportunity cost of allocating scarce water 
resources to agriculture. It was found that the MENA region suffers an opportunity cost of between 
293.6 billion USD and 582.8 billion USD per year by exporting its scarce blue water resources, and an 
opportunity cost of between 19 and 35 trillion USD per year for the sake of its bloated agricultural 
sector overall. 
 
This paper then argued that the costs of these allocations to agriculture are not being challenged, but 
instead are being supported by policies that maintain water supply in the short term without thought 
for long term sustainability. The fact of long-term mismanagement is overshadowed by discursive 
political processes and policies of misallocation are backgrounded by reliance on virtual water imports, 
which itself is backgrounded by political processes. The discursive patterns involved in these 
relationships of concealing and double-concealing are identified as worthy objects of further study. 
The entire process builds and entrenches economic dependency upon the agricultural sector – locking 
countries in the MENA region into low-value economics and hindering future possibilities for 
diversification. The MENA region has insubstantial renewable freshwater resources, and once the 
groundwater aquifers currently being overexploited for agriculture are depleted, then the stress from 
which the region should be decoupling now will come to the foreground. The costs of this – economic, 
social, environmental, political – are incalculable. 
 
Without effective decoupling and a reduction in both the short-term and the long-term opportunity 
costs of agricultural allocation in the MENA region, it is possible that the results over the coming 
centuries will be a continuation of poverty, conflict, and perhaps even the forced evacuation of this 
part of the world from significant human habitation. 
 
This thesis has drawn on the literature surrounding water scarcity, virtual water, decoupling, and 
water costing, to contribute two new aspects to scholarship. Firstly, this thesis has attempted a 
calculation of the opportunity costs of agricultural water allocation in the MENA region, and secondly, 
this thesis has expanded an understanding of backgrounding to show that the national and 
international efforts to address water scarcity and economic weakness tend to perpetuate water 
misallocation and unsustainable practices. 
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Appendix A: Data 
 
Figure A1: Agricultural Water Use in the MENA Region 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Freshwater, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5, accessed 
on 29/11/2016. 
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Figure A2: Population, TRWR and IRWR in the MENA Region – by Country, by Region, and per 
Capita 
 
Source: FAO/AQUASTAT, General Database Catalogue (2016), 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/results.html, and 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4473E/y4473E00.pdf, accessed 29/11/2016. 
 
* Data given to 1 decimal place. 
** Data for IRWR by country is placed in brackets to remind readers that it is not the appropriate 
measurement for freshwater availability within a particular country. 
*** The population of Jordan has increased significantly as a result of refugee pressures, and as a result the 
per capita renewable freshwater resources has fallen below 100 cubic metres per person per year. The figures 
for this entry are not taken from the same source as the rest of the data, but from the more up-to-date reports 
on the 2015 census in Jordan. See: Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2016, reported by: Ghazal, Mohammad, 
“Population stands at around 9.5 million, including 2.9 million guests”, in The Jordan Times, 30/01/2016, 
http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/population-stands-around-95-million-including-29-million-guests, 
accessed 29/11/2016; see also “Jordan Population 1960-2016”, in Trading Economics, 2016, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/jordan/population, accessed 29/11/2016. 
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Figure A3: Minimum IRWR Required to Avoid Water Stress in the MENA Region: Changes Over 
Time according to Population Increase 
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Figure A3: Minimum IRWR Required to Avoid Water Stress in the MENA Region: Changes Over 
Time according to Population Increase (continued) 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure A4: Water Footprint, TRWR, Freshwater Withdrawn, and the Discrepancy between 
Footprint and Withdrawals 
 
 
* Recall that TRWR measures are inappropriate to estimate regional availabilities – to do so, IRWR measures 
must be used. IRWR (MENA): 232.6 bcm; IRWR (MENA + Turkey): 459.6 bcm.  
 
Sources: Elaboration based on Water Footprint Network, “The Water Footprint Assessment Manual” (London: 
Earthscan, 2011), http://waterfootprint.org/media/downloads/TheWaterFootprintAssessmentManual_2.pdf, 
accessed 1/2/2017; Mekonnen & Hoekstra, National Water Footprint Accounts, Value of Water Research 
Report Series No. 50 (Delft: UNESCO-IHE, 2011), http://waterfootprint.org/media/downloads/Report50-
NationalWaterFootprints-Vol1.pdf, accessed 1/2/2017; FAO/AQUASTAT, General Database Catalogue (2016), 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/results.html, and 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4473E/y4473E00.pdf, accessed 29/11/2016. 
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Figure A5: Water Withdrawn Non-Renewably and Imported Virtually, by Country and Region 
 
 
 
Negative figures indicate that water is only withdrawn renewably, the spare being the specified amount. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure A6: Water Use, Agriculture, and Productivity* 
 
 
 
* All figures from 2014, unless otherwise indicated 
** Data from 2007 
*** Data from 2006 
 
Sources: FAO/AQUASTAT, General Database Catalogue (2016), 
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/results.html, and 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4473E/y4473E00.pdf, accessed 29/11/2016; 
World Bank, World Development Indicators: Freshwater, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5, accessed on 
29/11/2016. 
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Figure A7: Water Allocation by Sector 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators: Freshwater, 
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5, accessed on 29/11/2016. 
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Figure A8: Value of Agricultural Water 
 
 
 
Sources: Based on data from: World Bank, GDP Data, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, accessed 1/2/2017; World Bank, World 
Development Indicators: Freshwater, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.5, accessed on 29/11/2016. 
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Figure A9: Main agricultural exports (by value) leaving the MENA region 
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Figure A9: Main agricultural exports (by value) leaving the MENA region (continued) 
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Figure A10: Main agricultural imports (by value) entering the MENA region 
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Figure A10: Main agricultural imports (by value) entering the MENA region (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Trade Organisation (WTO), Trade Profiles, 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFHome.aspx?Language=E, accessed 13/1/2017. 
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Figure A11: Water needs of selected crops, relative to grass in the same environment 
 
 
 
Note, in temperate climates grass requires 4-6mm of freshwater per day. In arid or semi-arid climates this 
requirement rises to 10mm or above. 
 
Source: FAO, “Crop Water Needs”, http://www.fao.org/docrep/s2022e/s2022e02.htm, accessed 1/2/2017. 
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Figure A12: Growing times for selected crops 
 
 
 
Note, growing times will be shorter in hotter climates, and longer in cooler climates. 
 
Source: FAO, “Crop Water Needs”, http://www.fao.org/docrep/s2022e/s2022e02.htm, accessed 1/2/2017. 
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Appendix B: Conference Summaries 
 
Wilton Park, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
“Sharing innovation to address water challenges in the Levant” 
11th – 14th September 2016 
 
This conference considered efforts to address water challenges in Israel, Jordan, and the Occupied 
Territories. Scholars from all three countries or territories, as well as from the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and elsewhere, joined active and retired diplomats as well as engineers, scientists, and 
representatives from interested NGOs, charities, and the World Bank, to discuss technologies and co-
operation that could support a process of decoupling. 
 
Several technologies and techniques were discussed – some that have had good previous success in 
Israel and could be introduced to Jordan, and some that are recent innovations. For example: drip-
feed irrigation; salt-resistant crop strains (to enable irrigation with brackish or briny water); fish-
rearing-and-irrigation-water-treatment combined complexes; desalination technologies; and 
wastewater treatment technologies. 
 
However, the focus of the conference continually shifted towards one over-riding theme: it is politics 
that is determining, not technology, and it is at the political level (and at the level of first-hand 
agricultural water users) that changes to water allocation will come. These aspects are the crucial 
issues. 
 
It was noted on several occasions that part of the problem with political / social / economic 
reallocation of water resources is the direction and concentration of international finance and 
support. Social education projects to alter farmer behaviours “on the ground” and political efforts to 
rearrange water allocations are long-term and difficult, and do not receive long-term finance from 
organisations such as the World Bank, which show a preference for short-to-medium-term projects 
with clear and tangible outcomes. 
 
This conference was chaired under Chatham House rules. 
 
I attended this conference as rapporteur. My full report on proceedings can be accessed at: 
https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP1489-Report.pdf. 
 
 
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) 
“Environmental challenges in the MENA region” 
12th – 13th October 2016 
 
This conference considered a range of environmental challenges in the MENA region, including energy 
production and energy efficiency, climate change, and water resources and agricultural policies. About 
60 academics, diplomats, charity representatives, and civil servants attended to watch and discuss a 
series of presentations on these topics. Iyad Abumoghli, representing the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), introduced the UNEP’s Global Environmental Outlook (GEO) “6” regional 
assessment for West Asia (launched in May 2015) which provides detailed analysis of regional 
environmental challenges and policies. 
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GEO-6 identifies six regional environmental priorities: 
 
• Water; 
• Shared water resources; 
• Air quality; 
• Sustainable consumption; 
• Biodiversity; 
• Waste management. 
 
Water supply and allocation were discussed in relation to regional migration and the effects of the 
Syrian refugee crisis, and also in relation to the weakness of regional co-operation over shared river 
basins, such as the Jordan Valley. It was noted that overexploitation of groundwater resources 
throughout the region has caused deterioration of water quality, seawater intrusion, depletion and 
salinization of aquifers, and rising pump costs (as water tables fall). It was noted that investment does 
not reach infrastructure in Palestine because of the risk of Israeli bombing – infrastructure is usually 
the first target in war. 
 
John Waterbury noted that there is currently no significant policy-making authority in six of the major 
states in the MENA region; Waterbury identified the following countries as more or less “failed states”: 
Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Lebanon, and Somalia (a member of the Arab League). However, there 
continues to be a constant focus, in the UNEP for example, on changes in governance and policy – a 
focus which is entirely unrealistic. Without a functioning state such changes in governance and policy 
cannot be implemented in the MENA region, and will not be for a significant period of time. And yet, 
Waterbury concluded, environmental problems do not wait, but need to be dealt with now. 
 
It was noted that civil society – the grassroots power that could effect change even in failed states – 
is not engaged by the UN. Some governments in the region even ban NGOs. 
 
It was noted that the UNEP budget from the EU has dropped by 25 percent as the EU has reprioritised 
its spending due to the 2016 migrant crisis. 
 
A Resilience Development Strategy has been pursued in Lebanon and Jordan. 
 
Helen Lackner noted that in pre-war (pre-2015) Yemen, 55 percent of the population were 
economically dependent on agriculture and livestock, and 5 percent on fishing. Groundwater was 
expected to be depleted in 2 decades. Water scarcity in the Highlands led to migration to the coastal 
areas, leading to several villages becoming entirely deserted. Only 3 percent of the surface in Yemen 
is suitable for agriculture. Problems in Yemen include: No rain or heavy rain; drought or flash floods; 
and exhausted / washed-away top soils. 
 
Lackner noted that of the World Bank’s 400 million USD development budget, only 10 percent is 
allocated to agriculture and the environment. 
 
Lackner noted – in an echo to Waterbury – that regardless of war, the environmental situation needs 
to be dealt with immediately, which in the context means dealing with the local communities in 
Yemen. 
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It was noted that the humanitarian system is obsessed with “rights” for water (the Oslo Accords and 
the Paris Protocol were cited as examples). The humanitarian system wrongly assumes that 
governments can or will or should step in to provide for these rights, when in fact power is often 
exercised and trust gained horizontally at the local community level. 
 
It was argued that Israel seeks to control Palestinian virtual water exports, and to divert virtual water 
imports to itself. 
 
It was argued that there is a cultural conflict of ownership of the Nile between Egypt (Muslim) and 
Ethiopia (Christian), whereas Egypt and Sudan consider themselves brothers and so any conflict 
between these countries over the Nile is relatively benign. 
 
Nancy Lindisfarne highlighted the impact of water shortage and drought on political developments. 
She linked the drought that has occurred on and off in Darfur since 1969 to the long-standing conflict 
in the region. She argued that in Afghanistan, drought in 1970-2 was part of the reason that the 
monarchy fell, and drought again in Afghanistan in 1998-2004 was part of the reason that the Taliban 
lost support after the US-led invasion. Drought occurred again in Afghanistan in 2013-14. In Syria, 
Lindisfarne argued that drought and crop failure in 2005-10 pushed 1.5 million from the country to 
the cities, contributing to the causes of the current conflict. She argued that “famines are created by 
the actions and failures of governments” but that climate change can be used to hide the failures of 
government. 
 
It was noted that 75 billion USD has been pledged at the Paris Conference for environmental issues by 
2020, but that there is no enforcement mechanism and a shaky focus. The Paris Conference was 
deemed to constitute insignificant progress, and perhaps even a distraction. 
 
Tony Allan spoke to introduce his concept of virtual water. He also identified two contradictory 
narratives: 1) the socially and politically stabilising narrative that water resources are secure but 
limited (the implications being that water resources must be securitised; and that water conflict is a 
possible future, but not an immediate, problem); and 2) the destabilising narrative that must be 
backgrounded, that MENA economies are about 50 percent dependent on imported food. In recent 
decades, MENA economies have been able to take advantage of falling real prices for food (only 
nominal prices have increased, overall). The major global food exporters are the USA, Australia, 
Ukraine, Russia, and crucially South America. The major food importers are Western Europe, Asia, and 
crucially Africa and the Middle East. Africa’s population is expected to grow massively in our lifetimes. 
 
Allan argued that the following “knowns” have become “unknowns” by being backgrounded, but he 
argued that it is important that they should be foregrounded: the MENA region has a limited capacity 
to feed itself; Africa’s growing population will place a great strain on the global food trade; and the 
only way MENA can secure its food needs is by diversifying its economy, including by working with 
farmers. 
 
Michael Gilmont introduced his theory of water decoupling, referencing the UNEP definition of 
decoupling as “breaking the link between environmental bads and economic goods”. The established 
decoupling conceptualisation – on which Gilmont’s theory builds – is effective for finite global 
resources like fossil fuels, but not resources that are extracted and used locally. It is generally agreed 
that there is enough water globally to meet population growth, but blue and green water is regionally 
and locally constrained, such as in the MENA region. 
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Gilmont and Lara Nasser introduced research they are currently conducting into agricultural 
production in Jordan. The assumption of their research is that farmers should continue to produce the 
same amount of food, but for less water. Only 5 percent of Jordanian lands receive enough rainfall for 
rain-fed agriculture, and agriculture constitutes 61% of Jordan’s blue water use. The value of 
agricultural water use is low, at only 0.72 JD (1.02 USD) per cubic metre in 2014; the value of industrial 
water use is 47.7JD (67.25 USD) per cubic metre. According to Gilmont and Nasser’s study, Jordan 
could save 191 million cubic metres per year (out of 465mcm/yr) across 14 crops, and meetings will 
be held in November 2016 to share this information with government stakeholders and farmers. 
 
Gilmont and Nasser gave the date presented in the following table, showing levels of food import 
dependency in the region. 
 
 
Figure B1: Food import dependency in selected MENA countries 
 
 
 
Source: Gilmont, paper at conference. 
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Appendix C: Glossary 
 
Virtual water is the water that is embedded in a process of production. It is most commonly used to 
refer to the water inputs of agricultural produce, but in fact every product – agricultural or industrial 
– has virtual water “content”. 
 
Water footprint is the amount of water used – usually annually – by some unit (either national or 
per capita). 
 
Green Water is the water that remains embedded in soil as soil moisture after precipitation. 
 
Blue Water is the freshwater that is to be found in rivers, lakes, and aquifers. 
 
Decoupling is the process by which economic growth can be separated from resource constraints. 
Decoupling has been specifically linked to water management by Michael Gilmont. 
 
Backgrounding is the political and discursive process of concealing reliance on imported virtual 
water (and food). 
 
Water security is the ability to sustainably and securely access enough freshwater for domestic, 
industrial, and agricultural needs. 
 
For a reminder of the definitions and categories of water stress, see Figure 1 on page 2. 
 
For a reminder of the definitions of TRWR and IRWR, see Figure 2 on page 2 
 
Opportunity cost is the difference in economic benefit between a high-value use or operation and a 
low-value use or operation. 
 
Food security is the ability to secure sustainable and sufficient food supplies for a population. 
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